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CHAMI!IERS 01"

THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE

February 6, 1986

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

RE: National Treasury Employees Union v. United States (Civ. Action No. 85-4106, D.D.C.)
Synar v. United States (Civil Action No. 85-3945, D.D.C.)

A three-judge panel of the District Court for the District of
Columbia (Scalia, J.; Gasch, J.; N. Johnson, J.)

is currently consid-

ering a challenge to the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985 (commonly referred to as the Gramm-Rudman Act) •

The

Clerk's Office has informed me that a decision will be released tomorrow at noon.

I have directed the Clerk's Office to circulate copies

of the court's opinion and any related papers as soon as possible.
The timing is important in this case in part because President
has already issued a sequestration order pursuant to the Act.
order is to become effective on March 1, 1986.

That

Moreover, the Act it-

self provides that "[i]t shall be the duty of the District Court for
the District of Columbia and the Supreme Court of the United States to
adva

e docket and to expedite to the greatest

extent

the disposition of any" suit challenging the procedures under the Act.
Section 274(c).

Also, even if the District Court concludes that the

sequestration provisions of the Act are unconstitutional, it apparently will not be able to issue an injunction against their enforcement
until this Court completes review of the matter.

Section 274(e).
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The Act provides for a 30-day period for filling a jurisdictional
statement.

It is conceivable, however, that the losing parties will

file a jurisdictional statement much sooner than that in the hope that
we will decide the case before the President's order becomes effective
on March 1.
I assume the Court will note jurisdiction over any appeal.

If a

jurisdictional statement is filed promptly (e.g., by the end of next
week), I suggest we order that any response be filed within a very
brief period.

We will then need to consider to what extent we wish to

order expedited briefing and argument.

Our consideration of that

question, however, can await the three-judge panel's decision and the
filing of the jurisdictional statement .
. For the benefit of the Conference, I have attached to this memorandum a copy of the Act.

Hobart Rowen

1hl- ~12() I
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The Gramm-Rudman Ruling and the Fed
When a special federal court panel struck
down the Gramm-Rudman law's system of automatic budget cuts, it did more than throw in
doubt whether the highly touted deficit reductions will ever take place.
Because of the legal underpinnings of the
decision, it also exposed the Federal Trade
Commission and other regulatory agencies that
have been considered "independent" -especially the Federal Reserve Board-to a new
form of attack: from conservatives who bel~ve
these agencies should be subordinated to executive power.
The shoe has often been on the other political foot. For most of the Eisenhower presidency, Democrats complained about the independence of the Fed under chairman William
McChesney Martin. The Democrats argued
that tight-money policies pushed by Martin,
and acquiesced in by Ike, led to three recessions and high interest rates.
In the 1960 campaign for the presidenqy,
john F. Kennedy's advisers talked freely of the
need to fire Martin, or somehow box him in. At
that stage of history, preservation of the "independence" of the Fed became a rallying cry fur
conservatives. It was so effective that Kennedy
was forced to tone down his assaults.
Actually, Kennedy as president and Martll
}tit it off well, and JFK in 1962 reappointed

Martin to a four-year term. As most recent
chairmen have privately acknowledged, the
American central bank can be independent
within the government, but not truly independent of the wishes of any national administration.
All "independence" has ever meant is general acceptance of the view that the chairman
and governors, who have long (up to 14-year)
terms of tenure, are not part of the usual political process. That is, they do not have to fear
being removed by the president if the president happens to disagree with Fed policy.
The Fed board "was given political independence so that it would be able, when necessary,
to point out that the public interest required a
halt to inflationary pressures," wrote former
governor Sherman j. Maisel in "Managing the
Dollar," published in 1973.
Now, in the wake of the Gramm-Rudman
ruling, that sense of security of tenure is precisely what is being questioned. Bruc~ £Eilit,
former general counsel of the Fede~~
nications Commission, now a scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute, goes so far as
to say that the decision paves the way for "a
wholesale re-examination" of past precedents
supporting the independence of the regulatory
agencies, and an invalidation of "their independence from presidential removal."

Here's why. In the Gramm-Rudman case,
the lower court said that the comptroller general could not make the final decision triggering automatic budget cuts: that is a proper
function of the executive branch, and the
comptroller general is responsible to Congress,
not to the presjdent.
Since the comptroller general cannot be removed by the president, that official cannot exercise executive powers, the court said. Thus,
the panel seems to be saying that only someone who can be removed by the president can
exercise executive powers.
So where does that leave the Fed, and the
Federal Trade Commission, and other regulatory agencies whose governors or commissioners cannot be removed by the president (except for neglect of duty, inefficiency or malfeasance, subject to judicial review)?
Fed General Counsel Michael Bradfield said
in a brief conversation that the ruling "raises a
question, but it's premature to be seriously
concerned." To adopt the full implications of
the lower-court ruling, he said, the Supreme
Court would have to reverse 150 years in
which the concept of the independence of agencies with quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative
powers has prevailed.
Fein nonetheless argues that if the Supreme
Court upholds the lower court on Gramm-Rud-

man, the other agencies will be able to carry
out their functions only if the commissioners
and governors are for the frrst time subject to
being dismissed by the president.
The Federal Reserve System is especially
vulnerable, in Fein's view. That's because the
Federal Open Market Committee-the main
policy-making mechanism of the system-"has
a majority of persons who aren't even appointed by the president, much less removable
(by .the president]."
He's not quite right: the 12-member FOMC
is composed of the seven presidentially appointed reserve board governors and five of
the 12 presidents of regional Fed banks, selected by those banks. The five presidents (the
head of the New York Bank and a rotating four
out of the other 11) constitute an important
power bloc-and all 12 attend the FOMC
meetings-but they are not a majority.
Nonetheless, if the Supreme Court upholds
the reasoning by which the lower-court panel
erased the comptroller general from the
Gramm-Rudman process, we can anticipate
lawsuits by disgruntled citizens or banks who
will ask that various decisions of the Fed or
other agencies be held invalid. If that happens,
the long-term result could be to dilute or even
eliminate the exercise of executive powers out-.
side the president's control.
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SYNAR, ETC., ET AL.O
SUMMARY:

The National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), a

plaintiff-appellee in these consolidated appeals, seeks leave to
add an individual party as a plaintiff.
BACKGROUND:

These cases involve challenges to the Balanced

Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
referred to as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act).

(commonly ·~

On February 7,

1986, a three judge court issued an opinion holding, inter alia,
that the delegation of certain powers to the Comptroller General
violates the Constitution's provisions for the separation of
powers.

,-l
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On February 24, 1986, the Court noted probable

jurisdiction in these three appeals, ordered the appeals
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consolidated and granted the motion to expedite.

The appeals are

scheduled to be argued on Wednesday, April 23, 1986.
CONTENTIONS:

The NTEU seeks to add Van Riddel of Arlington,

Texas as an individual party plaintiff.

NTEU alleges that he is

a member of NTEU and has the status of an annuitant under the
federal civil service retirement laws.

The NTEU states that the

addition of Van Riddel "would alter neither the request for
relief nor the causes of action alleged."

The NTEU seeks to add

the individual party because the Government recently filed a
brief in this Court in International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, et al.
v. Brock, No 84-1777, in which the Government challenges the
doctrine of representational standing.
The NTEU suggests that the Court granted a similar motion in
Mullaney v. Anderson, 342

u.s.

415, 416-417 (1952).

In Mullaney

the petr challenged the standing of the resp union for the first
time in petr's brief to the Court.

The NTEU notes that in

granting resp's motion to add two of its members as parties
plaintiff, the Court stated:
To grant the motion merely puts the principal, the real
party in interest, in the position of his avowed agent.
The addition of these two parties plaintiff can in no
wise embarass the defendant. Nor would their earlier
joinder have in any way affected the course of
litigation.
The NTEU further represents that "the granting of the instant
motion would in no way prejudice any of the parties to this suit,
all of whom have consented to the filing of this motion, nor
would an earlier joinder have in any way affected the course of
the instant litigation."

f

The NTEU admits that its prior
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identical motion was denied by the DC but explains that result on
the ground that "the instant appeal had been already docketed by
this Court" and that the DC "did note the precedent set by
Mullaney."
DISCUSSION:

This case presents "special circumstances"

similar to those that supported the motion for leave to add
parties plaintiff in Mullaney.

Accordingly, the Court should

grant the motion or, in the alternative, defer ac t ion until after
oral argument.
First, this case presents a stronger case for efficient
judicial administration

tha~

was present in Mullaney.

In

Mullaney the Court noted that:
[T]o dismiss the present petition and require the new
plaintiffs to start over in the District Court would
entail needless waste and runs counter to effective
judicial administration-the more so since, with the
silent concurrence of the defendant, the original
plaintiffs were deemed proper parties below.
It is well known that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act establishes a
strict timetable for the reduction of the budget.

Accordingly,

this lawsuit was filed as soon after the Act as was possible and
it has been expedited in both the DC and this Court.

A prompt

decision on the constitutionality of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act is clearly in the nation's best interest.

A grant of the

motion will. insure that at least one plaintiff in these cases
clearly has standing to challenge the provisions of the Act.
This may be important as the standing of the other plaintiffs
(members of Congress) has been and remains a strongly contested
issue.

On the other hand, the doctrine of representational

standing has not been directly raised in this case and,
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therefore, may be left for consideration in International Union,
etc. v. Brock, No. 84-1777.
Second, as in Mullaney, the opposing party did not question
the union's standing in the lower court.

In this case,

the

Government apparently conceded in the DC that NTEU had standing.l
Finally, the addition of this party plaintiff will not alter
the request for relief or the causes of action alleged.
Furthermore, there is no suggestion that an earlier joinder would
have in any way affected the course of litigation.

Although the

DC denied the NTEU's identical motion, the motion was not made
until after these appeals ha·d been docketed in this Court.

Since

the motion impacts the status of the litigation in this Court,
the DC may have denied the motion because it felt that the motion
should be addressed to this Court.
Although the motion appears to be in order, the Court has
not received briefs on the matter from the other parties.2
Accordingly, if the Court has any questions about the motion, it
may want to defer action on the motion until after oral argument.
This has the advantage of not foreclosing any of the Court's
options.

On the other han8., if the Court is satisfied that the

1 On page six of its ~curiam op1n1on, the three judge court

notes "[Tlhe United States filed
judgment, again contending that
congressional plaintiffs must be
but conceding that NTEU appears

a cross-motion for summary
the complaint of the
dismissed for lack of standing
to have standing."

2 NTEU states that the parties "consented to the filing of this
motion." It is not clear whether the consent to NTEU filing the
motion is also a consent to the Court granting the motion.

f
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motion should be granted, the deferral of action may cause the
parties to needlessly brief the motion and the issue of NTEU's
standing.
CONCLUSIONS:

The motion should be granted because (a)

NTEU's standing was not challenged below,

(b) a grant would be

consistent with "effective judicial administration" as it would
remove a potential procedural barrier to the Court reaching the
merits of the litigation, and (c) the addition of a party
plaintiff will not alter the causes of action alleged or the
relief requested.

However, if the Court has any questions as to

the propriety of the motion; it can defer action on the motion
until after oral argument.
There is no response.

3/25/86

Schickele

Cov.rt ................... .
Argued ................... , 19 ..•
Submitted ................ , 19 .. .

l•oted on ......••.••.....•• , 19 •.•

Aasigned .................. , 19 . .•
Announced ................ , 19 •..

No. 85-1377

BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GEN.

vs.
SYNAR, MEMBER OF CONGRESS

~-

HOLD

roR

JURISDICTIONAL
MERITS
MOTION
CERT.
STATEMENT
~~~--~~~-.--4---r=-r~~-1
G

D

N

POST

DIS

AFF

REV

AFF

G

ABSENT

D

Burger, Ch. J. . . . . . . . . . . . ... .
Brennan, J................... .
White, J ..................... .
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .

·.y';; ..... .

v

Blackmun, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. .... · · · · · · · · · · ·

Powell, J.....................

7·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·j ........ ....

Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

·V'
················

...
Stevens, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
O'Connor, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... .

..........

•. •

NOT VOTING

'•

February 21, 1986 Conferenc~
Second Supplemental List
No. 85-1377
No. 85-1378
No. 85-1379

3

~

STATEMENTS AS TO JURISDICTIONl
Joint motion to consolidate
appeals, dispense temporarily
with printing and to expedite
consideration

BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL
U.S.SENATE
O'NEILL, SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE

v.
SYNAR, MEMBER OF CONGRESS, ET
AL.
SUMMARY:

The parties

~0

these actions which challenge the

constitutionality of the

, request that
their

the Court consolidate the

lrn light of (a)the publicity surrounding the Gramm-RudmanHollings Act and these lawsuits challenging the constitutionality
of the Act and (b) the short period of time between the receipt
of the jurisdictional statements and joint motion and the
February 21, 1986 Conference, the jurisdictional statements are
not discussed beyond the extent necessary for consideration of
the joint motion.
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consideration.
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The parties jointly propose procedures and

schedules to facilitate expedited consideration.
BACKGROUND:

On December 12, 1985 President Reagan signed

into law the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985, Pub. L. No. 99, 99 Stat. 1037, popularly known as the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.

-

Certain Members of Congress and the

National Treasury Employees Union immediately challenged the
constitutionality of the Act in the DC for the District of
Columbia.

The United States was the sole named defendant but the

United States Senate, the Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group
of the United States House of Representatives and the Comptroller
General of the United States were granted leave to intervene as
defendants.
/

The cases were consolidated, expedited and presented

-

.........

to a three judge court (Circuit Judge Scalia, District Judge

~Johnson

and Senior District

Judg ~ Gasch).

On February 7, 1986 the court issued a per curiam opinion.

the Act.2

2subsection 274(b) of the Act reads: "Notwithstanding any ~~
(Footnote continued)

-

3 -

The parties did not wait the 30 days allowed by subsection
274(b) for the filing of jurisdictional statements, rather on
February 18, 1986, the ComptroJler General (No. 85-1377), the
United States Senate (No. 85-1378) and the Speaker of the House,
et al. (No 85-1379), filed their jurisdictional statements.
Simultaneously, all the parties filed a "joint motion (1) to
consolidate appeals, (2) to expedite consideration of
jurisdictional statements, (3) to establish expedited schedule
for briefing and argument if probable jurisdiction is noted, and
(4) to permit initial filing of typewritten jurisdictional
statements and responses and reply briefs."
CONTENTIONS:

The parties initially note that the cases were

consolidated before the three judge court and the jurisdictional
~-

statements "present a single substantively identical
constitutional question."

The parties suggest that the interests

of judicial economy will be served by the consolidation of the
appeals before this Court.
The parties next request expedition on several grounds.
First, they note that subsection 274(c) of the Act provides that

(Footnote 2 continued from previous page)
other provision of law, any order of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia which is issued pursuant to an
action brought under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a)
shall be reviewable by appeal directly to the Supreme Court of
the United States. Any such appeal shall be taken by a notice of
appeal filed within 10 days after such order is entered; and the
jurisdictional statement shall be filed within 30 days after such
order is entered. No stay of an order issued pursuant to an
action brought under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a)
shall be issued by a single Justice of the Supreme Court.
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it is the "duty" of the Supreme Court "to advance on the docket
and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition"
of any challenge to the Act.

Second, the parties argue that

expedition would further the interests of all the parties because
in light of the stay plaintiffs cannot obtain any relief until
the Court finally disposes of the appeals, and the defendants
cannot be sure how to proceed as long as the appeals are pending.
Third, the parties note that while the DC's judgment invalidates
"both the automatic trigger mechanism under the Act and the first
use of that mechanism," the stay allowed the first sequestration
of funds (on February 1, 1986) to take effect.

The parties

suggest that "[T]he propriety and efficacy of this major
reduction in government spending will remain uncertain until the
Court completes its consideration of these appeals."

Fourth, the

parties suggest that the "timing of the federal budget cycle
under the Act provides an especially compelling basis" for
expedition because reports on the proposed budget deficit are due
on August 20, 1986 and further action is required by October 1,
1986.

Finally, the parties note that the Court "historically

expedites cases in circumstances such as these, when expedition
is required to further national goals of overriding importance."
Citing Dames and Moore v. Regan, 452

u.s.

932 (1981), Buckley v.

Valeo, 424 U.S. 213 (1976), and United States v. Nixon, 417

u.s.

927 (1974).
To facilitate expedition (assuming probable jurisdiction is
noted) the parties propose the following briefing schedule.
Appellants will file their briefs on March 19, 1986.

Appellees

- 5 -

will file their responsive briefs on April 9, 1986.

Appellants'

reply briefs and "appellees' reply briefs responding solely to
briefs of other appellees on issues of standing, delegation and
the role of Congressional Budget Office" will be filed by April
16, 1986.

The additional appellees' reply briefs are requested

because the United States and the plaintiffs are in conflict on
several fundamental questions (for example, whether either
plaintiff has standing to bring the actions).
The parties request that the Court schedule oral argument
"on April 23, 1986, or as soon thereafter as the Court's calendar

---------------

permits" and allot two hours for argument.

They suggest that

"the significance of the constitutional question presented by the
appeals and the magnitude of the impact of the resolution of that
question" merit extended argument.

The parties note that the

Court heard extended argument in Dames and Moore, Buckley, and
United States v. Nixon.

The parties anticipate filing a motion

at a future time to permit divided argument.
In order to facilitate expedition, the parties also request
the following variances from the Court's usual procedures: (1)
leave to file the joint motion . in typewritten form,

(2) "leave to

file jurisdictional statements and responses initially in
typewritten form, with printed submissions to follow," (3) "leave

----------

to file appendix to jurisdictional statements initially in
typewritten form, with printed submission to follow, as part of
joint appendix if probable jurisdiction is noted, and
independently if it is not," and (4) leave to file reply briefs
initially in typewritten form.

-

DISCUSSION:

6 -

Even without the provisions of subsection 274

of the Act, it appears that the three judge court's decision is
properly appealed directly to this Court, and that the Court
should note probable jurisdiction and expedite plenary
consideration of the appeals.

Since the court held that an Act

of Congress was, in part, unconstitutional, a, direct app2 al is

-

authorized by 28 USC §1252.

-----.

The reduction of the federal debt is

universally conceded to be essential to the welfare of the
country.

Accordingly, the three judge courts' opinion, which

interferes with the legislative and executive branches' plan for
reducing the debt, should be expedited to "the greatest extent
possible" (regardless of the soundness of the three judge courts'
opinion) .
I recommend that the parties joint motion be granted in all
respects
argument.

ex ~ t

the

requ ~ t

-

that two hours be set aside for oral

---------·--

While the appeals may well merit extended argument, it

is not clear that they require two hours of argument.

I suggest

that the Court reserve its determination of the length of
argument until the parties file their motion for divided
argument.

At that time, several briefs will have been filed and

the Court should be in a better position to determine how
extensive oral argument need

be~

·

In all other respects the parties have tailored their joint
motion to meet the Court's interests as well as their own.

The ·

cases were consolidated below and it is in both the parties' and
the Court's interest to consolidate the appeals. The proposed
briefing schedule is tighter than the Court might have imposed

- 7 -

and the limited appellees' reply briefs are ' calculated to clarify
the appellees' conflicting positions.

Finally, the submission of

briefs in typewritten form initially, while more expensive to the
---·-

--------------.\

parties, allows for expeditious briefing without the loss of the
...___---... of printed briefs.
benefit

CONCLUSIONS:

The three judge court's holding that the

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act is in part unconstitutional is clearly
of such importance that the Court should immediately note
probable jurisdiction and expedite plenary consideration of the
appeals.

To thjs end, the joint motion should be granted in all

respects, except the Court might reserve a ruling on the amount
of time set aside for oral argument until the parties file their
motion for divided argument.
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MEMO TO MIKE:
This

is

the

Gramm-Rudman

litigation

that

probably

will be viewed as the most important case of this Term.
As appears from the cover page of the SG' s brief,

there

were three separate lawsuits consolidated by the DC.
first

was

by

Congressman

Mike

Synar

(joined

by

The

eleven

other Congressmen) , sought a declaratory judgment that the
Gramm-Rudman
United

(the

is

unconstitutional.

view that the role of the Comptroller General under

the

General,

the House and

The
its

is

informed

Act)

the Senate of

Act

States

Act

unconstitutional.
the

Senate,

and

This
the

prompted
Speaker

the

and

a

Comptroller
By-partisan

Leadership Group of the House, to intervene as defendants
in support of the constitutionality of the Act.

I should

have noted that in addition to the suit initially filed by
Congressman Synar, something called the "National Treasury
Employees Union" also filed a suit seeking to invalidate
the Act.

2.

As I understand the situation, the basic controversy,
in

terms of

the parties,

Congressmen,

seeking

to

is

between

the

invalidate

the

Synar group of
Act,

and

the

intervenors named above seeking to sustain the validity of
the Act.

The United States itself apparently is not named

as a party,
amicus

and

brief

President's

its brief supports

position

(the

though not characterized as
my

understanding

Executive

Branch),

of

the

that

the

central provision of the Act vesting unprecedented power
in the Comptroller General is unconstitutional.
The
itself,

three-judge

DC,

convened

pursuant

to

the

Act

agrees with the United States that the authority

granted the Comptroller General
of the Legislative Branch -

(see below)

-

an officer

intrudes unconstitutionally on

the powers of the President.

Put simply, the DC found a

violation of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers.
The purpose of Gramm-Rudman is to achieve a balanced
federal budget by 1991 through progressively lower deficit
targets for the next fiscal years.
the

Comptroller

General

will

The Act provides that

issue

a

report

to

the

President and Congress each fiscal year that contains an
estimate

of

budget cuts

the

size of

that are

the deficit,

necessary

and

specifies

in each federal

the

spending

3.

account

to

meet

the

applicable

deficit

target.

The

President then is required to sequester federal funds

in

accordance with the Comptroller General's report.
The Comptroller General,

is the head of the General

Accounting Office (GAO), "an instrumentality of the United
States

Government

Departments".

independent

of

the

Executive

He is appointed for a fifteen year term by

the President, with advice and consent of the Senate, but
-

and this

removal

is critical

only by Joint

in this case -

he is subject to

Resolution of Congress.

Although

appointed by the President,

this Court has held that the

Comptroller

officer

Branch

General

whose

Congress.

is

principle

Bowsher

v.

an
duty
Merck

is

of

the

to

serve

Co. ,

460

Legislative

the

needs
424,

484

Two other offices that are confusing for me are:

the

&

u.S.

of

(1983).

Director of the Office of Management & Budget
the

Director

The

Act

of

requires

the

Congressional

these

two

offices

Budget

(OMB), and

Off ice

to prepare

(CBO) .
a

joint

report for the Comptroller General that estimates the size
of the federal deficit for

the next fiscal year.

After

the Comptroller General receives the OMB-CBO report, he is
required by the Act to issue a report to the President and

4.

Congress setting forth his own budget determinations for
each of
Act

the

items contained

requires

the

"independent

in the OMB-CBO report.

Comptroller

analysis",

General

giving

to

due

undertake

regard

to

The
and
the

recommendations of the OMB and the CBO.
In any year in which the Comptroller General predicts
that the deficit will exceed the Act's target by more than
$10

bill ion,

eliminating

the

the

President

full

amount

"shall
of

the

issue

an

deficit

determined by the Comptroller General.

order"

excess,

as

To accomplish that

purpose, the President's order must sequester all forms of
federal

budget

Comptroller
certain

resources

General's

automatic

"in

accordance

with"

report and must modify or

spending

increases.

The

the

suspend

President's

order "must be consistent with" the Comptroller General's
report
modify

"in

all

or

determinations,
percentages".

respects",

recalculate

and
any

specifications,

the

President

of
bases,

the

"may

not

estimates,
amounts,

or

(There are other provisions that need not

be mentioned here).
With respect to the fiscal year 1986, the Comptroller
General issued his report to the President and Congress,

5.

and on February 1 the President issued an. order making the
necessary reductions that totaled $11.7 billion.
The DC held that the Act is unconstitutional because
"the powers conferred upon the Comptroller General as part
of the automatic deficit reduction program are Executive
Powers,

which cannot constitutionally be exercised by an

officer

removable

that

the

by

the

Comptroller

The

Congress".

General's

duties

DC

also

under

the

found
Act

require "interpretation of the law", and the "exercise of
substantial

judgment concerning present and future

facts

that affect the application of the law", both of which are
powers normally committed initially to the Executive under
the Constitution's requirement that he "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed".

Article II, Section 3.

In this memorandum I am relying primarily on the SG's
brief that is quite well written.
memoranda as
saying

that

I

I may dictate further

read additional briefs.

the

Doctrine

of

Separation

central principle of the Constitution.
doctrine
"officers

concerns
of

the

the

appointment

United

It goes without

States

Powers

is

a

One aspect of this

and
who

of

removal
are

of

charged

the
with

I

administering

the

laws

enacted

by

Congress.

The

Constitution provides that the President shall nominate,

6.

with

advice

and

consent

of

the

Senate,

the

principle

officers of the government."
Although
for removal,
123,

this

the Constitution doesn't expressly provide

Court

incidental

to

held

the

u.s.

that

power

necessary aspect of
President.

u.s.

in Myers v. United States, 272

the

of

the

power

52, 115-

to

remove

as

well

appointment,

"Executive Power" vested

is

as

a

in the

But Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295

602, barred the President from removing a member of

the Federal Trade Commission except for cause, because of
the Commission's independence as a "quasi-legislative" and
"quasi-judicial"
question

the

participate
officer

of

body.

holding

Humphrey's
of

Myers

that

(except by impeachment)
the

Executor

United States whose

Congress

did

not

may

not

in the removal of an
is charged with

the

administration of laws.
The DC accordingly held that §251 of the Gramm-Rduman
Act

is

Powers.
maker

inconsistent with

the principle of Separation of

The Comptroller General is the central decision
in the

administrative

The President and

implementation of

that Act.

the Executive Departments and agencies

are subordinated to the Comptroller General.

7.

Therefore, the first - and decisive flaw in the Act is

that

removal

the

Comptroller

by

the

authority and

Congress,

control
The

Presidents.

General,

SG

over

an

is

vested

the

Executive

identifies

constitutional defect".

officer

a

with

subject

substantial

Powers

"second

to

of

the

fundamental

The Comptroller General does not

serve at the pleasure of the President as he is appointed
for

a

15-year

General

term.

under

this

Thus,
Act

although

takes

over

the

Comptroller

certain

of

the

President's powers, he cannot be removed by the President.
But

"more

is

a

stake"

than

a

incumbent to remain in office.
integrity
General
assigned

of
is

the

Separation

disqualified

to

him

under

personal

of

the

In order to preserve the
Powers,

of

from
§251

right

the Comptroller

performing
of

the

Act

the

duties

because

the

provision for Congressional removal, and his status as an
officer

of

the Legislative

Branch,

affect the nature of

his office.
It

has

has

been

suggested

that

the

unconstitutionality of §251 could be removed by "severing"
the statutory provision for Congressional removal of the
Comptroller

General

from

office.

But

the

SG says

this would not save the Act from unconstitutionality.

that

8.

Before

concluding

this memorandum,

I

record

for

my

own information that the first full paragraph on p. 13 of
the

SG's

summary

brief
of

contains

why

unconstitutional:

the

a

SG

clear,
argues

and
that

understandable,
the

Act

is

in addition to Congressional control by

virtue of its authority to remove the Comptroller, the Act
vests in that officer powers to make "economic and fiscal
projections

and

deficit

reduction

calculations

that

are

binding on the President and the entire Executive Branch."
Subject to reading other briefs, and also reflecting
further on the SG's argument, I am tentatively inclined to
think

the

DC

correctly

found

unconstitutional.
LFP, JR.

the

Act

to

be
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

April 21, 1986

Mike

No. 85-1377

Bowsher v. Synar

85-1378

u.s.

85-1379

O'Neill v. Synar

Senate v. Synar

Date: April 19, 1986

QUESTION PRESENTED
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985

(the

Act)

requires

the Comptroller General

budgetary deficiencies and,
impose budget cuts.

to assess

the

pursuant to statutory instructions,

The Comptroller General is appointed by the

President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and is removable for certain statutorily defined reasons by joint resolu-

~1-o

page 2.

~~p~· ·
tion of Congress.
these

/

Does delegation to the Comptroller General of

responsibilities

violate

the

constitutional

principle of

separation-of-powers?
BACKGROUND
Congress enacted the Act

in December 1985.

You are at

least as well acquainted as I am with the concerns that led to
the passage of the Act and its consequent importance.

The Act is

intended to achieve a balanced federal budget by 1991 by setting
deficit
requires
(OMB)

"targets"
the

for

each year,

Director

of

the

starting with 1986.

Office

of Management

The Act

and

Budget

and the Director of the Congressional Budget Office

(CBO)

to prepare reports estimating the size of the federal deficit:
the Comptroller General then issues his own independent report to
the President and to Congress each fiscal year that contains an
estimate of the size of the deficit and specifies the budget cuts
that are necessary to meet the deficit target for that year.
President then

is required to

"sequester"

federal

funds

The

in ac-

cordance with the Comptroller General's report.
This
year 1986.

statutory

process

has

already

started

for

fiscal

The Comptroller General received the joint report of

the OMB and CBO on January 15, 1986.

His report, issued on Janu-

ary 21, 1986, found that the Act requires sequestration of $11.7
billion
this year.l
'-= _ ... _
~

on February 1, 1986.

The President issued his sequestration order
It became effective on March 1, 1986.

1 This reminds me of the statement attributed to Senator
Dirksen: "A billion here, a billion there, pretty soon it starts
to add up to money! "

page 3.

The Comptroller General
This case turns in large part on the nature of the Office
of Comptroller

For

General.

that

reason,

I

will

briefly give

some background detail on that officer.
The First Congress (in 1789) when it created the Treasury
Dep't

also

Treasury,

established
with

a

wide

within

Treasury

variety

of

a

Comptroller

of

the

In ~

responsibilities.

these mixed functions were transferred to a new and independent
General Accounting Office
eral.
with

("GAO")

The Comptroller General
the

years.

advice

and

consent

headed by the Comptroller Gen-

is appointed by the President, 2

of

the

Senate,

for

a

term of 15

The Comptroller General is subject to removal by a joint

resolution of Congress,

31

u.s.c.

§703(a) (1),

(b),

---r,------, ''

-"
_J..,....., .. • •...... .. ~ .~ ~- _. -·~ • •
t,.K..C.'-"C..,

reasons defined in the statute.
.

for

certain

This congressional power of re-

~

moval makes

the Comptroller General unique among

federal off i-

cers, who are generally removable by the President for cause.
As a factual matter, I do not think there can be any serious

"independent ~
,4._ L d,;l.• .J..
The SG goes to great lengths to try and prove that ~eC G-

dispute

agency."

'

GA-O

Comptroller

about

the

fact

General/GAO are

that

merely

the

an

GAO

is

an

agency of

the

Congress. · • 1 c
.~~<"

~

2The SG notes that a l980 §t2tpte authorizes Congress to
~~
propose names to the President for appointment as Comptroller
General, and implies that therefore the Comptroller General is
not truly an executive officer. SG Br. at 40-41~ Synar Brief at
47.
But Congress in enacting the 1980 law accepted the fact that
the President had to retain full control over appointments, as
dictated by this Court's opinion in Buckley v. _Valeo. Therefore,
under the law, the President is free to select for aEpojntm~t an
individual whose name is not on the recommended
S. Rep.
No.
t
d Sess. 1
(19
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Because this is a subsidiary point,

I will not go to any great

lengths to support the flat statement that the SG is wrong.

The

GAO is not different in any material res ect (other than the removal power discussed above)

from any other independent agency.

it is true that the GAO performs some reporting functions
to Congress, and that the President is required to forward GAO's

1>-~ budget
~

estimate to Congress without change, the same is true of

other independent agencies, and is consistent with the GAO's status as a "watchdog" agency.
The Relevant Cases
I will briefly set out the holdings of the relevant cases
so that I can refer to them by shorthand hereafter.

v --

A. Myers v. United States, 272

u.s.

52 (1926)

involved a postmas-

ter appointed by the President for a four-year term; he was dis~

~

·l

f~

-------

missed by the President despite a tenure-of-office act requiring

.I

the advice and consent of the Senate for his removal.

The Court,

'~~in an opinion by Chief Justi~~ - Taft, held that for Congress to
~ "~ to itself • • . the power to remove or the right to partic-

~~pate

V';;

W consti tutional principle of

~ers.:
wlt:J

Id., at 161.

[would bel

to infringe the

the separation of governmental pow-

The holding in Myers is also partly based on

~ea expressed by Congress in 1789 and by earlier Court opin-

y'l ~s
~

in the exercise of that power

that t~ power of removal is incident to the power of ~-

pointment.
B. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295

u.s.

602 (1935) was

a suit for back pay by a commissioner of the Federal Trade Com-

----......

mission whom FDR had fired without cau~e.

The FTC Act provided

z:J~
~~-r.....
r~)

that the commissioners "may be removed by the President for

~-J~

t!.£ier;cy, neglect of duty, or

Court~

-malfeasance in

..

office."

The

.

upheld this Congressional limitation on the President's removal
powers.

~"'-?'--

.

"purely executive officers" and that it did not apply to an offi_.;;~ ...
'-'~

-

cer like the FTC commissioner, who was independent of the execu-

- ·

tive.

The holding in Humphrey's Executor facilitated the growth

of the so-called independent agencies like the FTC, the Federal

Reserve, and the Comptroller General. (j;f..._t.._.3.

c.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424

challenge
sion.

to

the

u.s.

1

(1975)

establishment of

~

k

~j

involved a constitutional

the Federal Election Commis-

The Court, inter alia, held that the Commission could not

exercise the powers of Officers of the United States because they
were appointed

by Congress.

The Appointments Clause,

Art.

II,

§2, cl. 2, vests in the President the power to appoint all Officers- of the Uni~tates.
D. INS v. Chadha, 462
one-house veto.

u.s.

919 (1983)

involved a challenge to the

Although its actual holding is not strictly rel-

evant to this case, much of its reasoning regarding separationof-po~ers

is pertinent.
DISCUSSION

1. Standing

This case presents some difficult issues of congressional

~ and representational standing.
,rl/
~ vidual

~has
.

member of the National Treasury Employees

Union,~early

standing to raise all the issue presented by this case;

~r~ct,

/

One of the plaintiffs, an indi-

his standing appears to be unopposed.

in

I therefore recom-

page 6.

mend that you follow the SG's suggestion,
defer cons'deration of the congressional
in~

issues for full

brief~~

SG Br. 12, n.

9, and

nd associational stand-

aEd _aJE~nt

in the cases listed by

the SG.
2. Delegation of Congressional Power
There

is

some

argument

that

the

Act

represents

overbroad delegation of power by Congress to an agency.
rejected this argument.

an

The DC

It referred to the detailed descriptions

in the Act of the statistical presumptions that are binding on
the Comptroller

General,

and of

the explicit instructions con-

cerning which programs to cut and how.

The Act does not delegate

even as much discretion and legislative judgment to an agency as
other

Acts

that

previously have

been upheld.

I

conclude tha.t

there is no violation here of the nondelegation doctrine.

~:n::::ressional
~

Retention of Removal Power over the Comptroller

The principal issue in this case revolves around the fact
that Congress has the power to remove the Comptroller General.
The arguments take various forms.

----

into two basic arguments.
twined,

I

I think they can be distilled

Because these arguments are so inter-

--'

discussion.
Argument One: Congress' assertion of the power to remove
the

~~~

~
will present the substance of the argument before any~~~·~

Comptroller General

is an unconstitutional

infringement on

the President's power of removal.
This argument involves the extent to which Congress, acting in its legislative capacity, may specify the standards and

page 7.

procedures that will govern the President in exercising the power
to remove federal officers.
Executor,

reading

the

former

It focuses on Myers and Humphrey's
broadly and

the

latter

narrowly.

Myers reasoned that because the Constitution granted the President the right to appoint all "Officers of the United States," it
impliedly granted him some power of removal over those same Officers.

Congress,

therefore, can at most only incidentally regu-

late or define the President's power of removal.

Humphrey's Ex-

ecutor is read as defining the vt ry limit of Congress' ability to
infringe

the

President's

removal

power:

Congress can 1 imi t

the

I'

---

President to removal for cause with respect to "independent agen.......

cies" that operate outside the direct control of the President.
Argument
retaining

for

T~

~e:

The Constitution prohibits Congress from

itself control over

~\

II

the execution of a law after

--

its enactment by granting itself the power of removal over the

----------------

-

....

executive officer entrusted with the administration of the law.
Sl

\~

The focus of this argument is the r~ s.

The

argument examines the extent to which Congress may inject itself
into the administration of a law after its enactment.

The cen-

tral point of the argument is that Congress may not delegate the
task of carrying out a law that it has passed to federal officers
who are responsible to Congress.
limitation on Congress'
into the removal process.

This argument reads Myers as a

authority to

inject

itself

in any way

Humphrey's Executor is read as a repu-

diation of dicta in Myers to the effect that Congress could not
place

limitations

on

the

President's

removal

power.

In other

words, while Congress may well have authority to limit the Presi-

page 8.

dent's removal power, it may not take to itself any removal power.
The

DC opinion merged

these two arguments.

While they

~---------------------,--------~-----------------

-

it

seem very similar,

is very

important to separate them out.

Argument One would require the Court to cast doubt on Congress'
ability to create independent agencies.

Particularly in the last

half-century, Congress has perceived a need to assign some tasks
that are executive
insulated

to

some

in nature
extent

from

to agencies or officers that are
political

influence

or

control.

The recent--and much-needed--independence of Chairman Volker

is

only the latest example of tasks that may be better performed by
independent

officers

or

agencies.

One

of

the

principal means

used by Congress to insulate these officers from political conInstead of

cerns is to limit the President's power of removal.

serving at the pleasure of the President, these officers are usu-

---------··

----------

---------- ------ -

ally appointed for a term of years and may only be removeq for

--

cause.

-

The constitutional defect of the Act,

-

then,

is not that

Congress has imposed any limit on the President's right of remov-

-

al.

Congress can assign executive tasks to officers that are to

s ome degree

insulated

from political removal by the President.

What the Constitution forbids is for Congress to enact a law, and
.:==then

ret;_iiJ_e~t!'k: ~ r ~hec=,i!!!glementi~g _;>ffic~:.

what happened, to a lesser degree, in Myers.
ers

provided

for

the

removal

of

postmasters

"with the advice and consent of the Senate."

That is

The statute in
by

the

272

u.s.,

MY-

President
at 107.

The actual holding in Myers is that Congress may not retain any

~

w7:;.:f
·

'-"'1....1

~-

~~""
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substantive control over those who are assigned to execute the
laws.

There is broad dicta in Myers to the effect that Congress

may not impose any limits on the President's removal power, but
that dicta was specifically discredited in Humphrey's Executor,
which

involved almost an identical statute.

The Constitutional

principle that remains after these two cases is that Congress is

----

free (to an undetermined extent) to limit the President's removal
po~r

over

independent officers or agencies.

--

But is prohibited

from retaining any removal power itself over those same officers •
._.,,.......,_..

h.........,_,

-~

...............~twa•

.,.,

The SG makes a slight variation of Argument Two.
tends

that

congressional

retention of

the power

He con-

to remove the

Comptroller General, along with other factors, indicates that the
Comptroller General is not truly an independent agency, but rather an agent of Congress.

This argument would have great merit

if, and only if, Congress actually were delegating the execution
of the Act to an agent or committee of Congress.

But, as I ex-

plained earlier, the Comptroller General cannot fairly be character ized as

an agent of Congress.

The Comptroller General--and ·--..-;

the o!!J~s, t~AO--fi: into the category of independent
agencies.
____________...
in this way, I

The reason the SG characterizes the argument

believe, is that it impliedly makes the argument

that Congress cannot limit the President's removal power.
the SG and the DC would read Myers
would

have

Both

to create such a rule, and

the Court either strictly limit Humphrey's Executor

(to agencies that perform "quasi-judicial" or "quasi-legislative"
functions)
those

or altogether reconsider the opinion.

·---------

cases

in

the

same

way.

But

perhaps

the

I do not read
more

prudent

page 10.

course, given the importance of these principles and their infrequent

review

in

this Court,

is simply to state that this case

does not present the question of Congress' authority to limit the
'l '

President's

t'-

removal

power,

because whatever

~

J(

be, Congress cannot retain any removal power

those 1 imi ts might
itself over those

~----------~

who execute the laws .

.._______..

4. Severability:
L

•

Rather than engage in any extended discussion,

let me just say that I conclude that the fallback provision of
the Act

indicates that Congress

7

intended that the grant of au-

thority to the Comptroller General be severed from the rest of
the Act.

The Comptroller General argues that the Court must look

to the intent of the 1921
_____.. Congress in order to determine the relevant

intent.

But

--

since

that

----

time,

Congress has

----..

duties of the Comptroller General many, many times.

---

added to . the
It would be

very difficult to track down and determine in each of those instances whether Congress would prefer that the substantive grant
of power be withdrawn, or that Congress'
Comptroller

General

be

withdrawn.

removal power over the

The much

simpler,

and

more ~

defensible approach, is to allow the fallback provision contained
in the very Act at issue here to come into play.

----------

'

CONCLUSION

I recommend affirming the DC, but for the reasons stated /
here: Congress cannot retain to itself any power of removal over
Executive

----------------~---

Officers

or

their

styled "independent agencies."

agencies,

including

those

usually

'---
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To: Justice Powell
From: Mike
Re:

11

Gramm-Rudman 11

Nos. 85-1377, 1378, 1379

Date: April 24, 1986
My final recommendation is that it violates separation of
powers principles for Congress to grant itself removal power over
an officer entrusted with the execution of a law.

You asked

which case provided the most direct support for that proposition.
In fairness, no case provides
proposition.

11

direct 11 support for that

Like most separation of powers questions, the

answer depends to some extent on abstract reasoning and secondary
sources such as The Federalist Papers.

The cases do support,

however, a more general proposition that includes the narrower
proposition I recommend.

In INS v. Chadha, 462

u.s.

919 (1983),

the Court recognized the fundamental principle that the
11

Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new

Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that
each branch of government would confine itself to its assigned
responsibility ...

Id., at 951.

The point of this principle is

that when Congress enacts a law, its authority with regard tq ~
~~-.!I, s; 3
·~
that law is at an end: the Constitution entrusts the ~sotment of
~

~

such laws only to the Executive, through his appointed 11 officers
~!I J z
of the United States... 11 Congress must abide by its delegation of
1

authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or
revoked ...

',J

t

Id., at 955.

Congress has delegated the execution of

the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act to the
C<2_rnpt_Ioll~al;

it has no authority to exercise any control
'-........_..

over the implementation of that Act.
from that general proposition:
r~e

My recommendation sterns

I reason that Congress' power to

the Comptroller General is a form of control over the

implementation of the Act.

As we discussed, the ultimate

question is whether the bare existence of a statutory power to

__..,

remove the Comptroller General for specified reasons (e.g.,
inefficiency) actually does amount to a form of congressional
control over the implementation and execution of a duly enacted
law.
Lloyd Cutler's argument is a practical one.

He contends

that the Comptroller General has no real need to feel any
subservience to Congress.

In the 65 years that Congress has had

removal power over the Comptroller General, it has never even
threatened to use it, even during times of momentary
disagreement.

In addition, the Comptroller General is appointed

by the President, and naturally feels some loyalty to the one who
gave him the job.

Finally, if Congress attempted to remove the

Comptroller General for political reasons, it would have to
justify its actions in terms of the statutory list of reasons for
removal, which is fairly narrow.

It also would have to pass a

joint resolution of Congress in order to remove him.

If the

President vetoes the joint resolution, Congress would have to
override the veto with a two-thirds majority.

In practical

terms, then, the Comptroller General has nothing to fear from
Congress.

The argument on the other side is that if Congress is
allowed to enact a constitutionally infirm removal provision over
executive officers, and if such provisions will not be
invalidated by this Court until they are actuall

used, a serious

constitutional unbalance could take place without any judicial
review.

If the existence of Congress' removal power does result

in some subservience to Congress, then actual removal never will
be necessary.

In that manner, Congress can obtain the

unconstitutional power it desires without ever triggering this

_______,

Court's review.

Rather than risk such a situation, the Court

should draw a bright line that forbids Congress from even
attempting to take to itself a power that the Constitution
forbids it to have.

"[T)he fact that a given law or procedure is

efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to
the Constitution."

Chadha, 462

u.s.,

at 944.

"It may seem odd

that this curtailment of such an important and hard-fought
legislative program should hinge upon the relative technicality
of authority over the Comptroller General ••• But the balance of
separated powers established by the Constitution consists
precisely of a series of technical provisions that are more
important to liberty than superficially appears, and whose
observance cannot be approved or rejected by the courts as the
times seem to require."

Svnar v. United States, slip op. at 49

(D.D.C. 1985).

As I expressed to you earlier, I have not been able to
come to rest between the two arguments expressed above.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES C
Nos. 85-1377, 85-1378

AND

85- 1379

CHARLES A. BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANT
85-1377
v.
MIKE SYNAR, MEMBER OF
CONGRESS, ET AL.
UNITED STATES SENATE, APPELLANT
85-1378
v.
MIKE SYNAR, MEMBER OF
CONGRESS, ET AL.
THOMAS P. O'NEILL, JR., SPEAKER OF THE UNITED
STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
ET AL., APPELLANTS
v.
85-1379
MIKE SYNAR, MEMBER OF
CONGRESS, ET AL.
ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[June-, 1986]

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The question presented on this appeal is whether the
assignment by Congress to the Comptroller General of the
United States of certain functions under the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 violates the doctrine of separation of powers.

1/-e..v k ~
~ ~
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BOWSHER v. SYNAR

I

A
On December 12, 1985, the President signed into law the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037, popularly known as the
"Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act." The purpose of the Act is
to eliminate the federal budget deficit. To that end, the Act
sets a "maximum deficit amount" for federal spending for
each of fiscal years 1986 through 1991. The size of that maximum deficit amount progressively reduces to zero in fiscal
year 1991. · If in any fiscal year the federal budget deficit exceeds the maximum deficit amount by more than a specified
sum, the Act requires across-the-board cuts in federal spending to reach the targeted deficit level, with half of the cuts
made in defense programs and the other half made to nondefense programs. The Act exempts certain priority programs from these cuts. § 255.
These "automatic" reductions are accomplished through a
rather complicated procedure, spelled out in § 251, the socalled "reporting provisions" of the Act. Each year, the
Directors of the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB")
and the Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") independently
estimate the amount of the federal budget deficit for the
upcoming fiscal year. If that deficit exceeds the maximum
targetted deficit amount for that fiscal year by more than a
specified amount, the Directors of OMB and CBO independently calculate, on a program-by-program basis, the budget
reductions necessary to ensure that the deficit does not exceed the maximum deficit amount. The Act then requires
the Directors to report jointly their deficit estimates and
budget reduction calculations to the Comptroller General.
The Comptroller General, after reviewing the Directors'
reports, then reports his conclusions to the President.
§ 251(b). The President in turn must issue a "sequestration"
order mandating the spending reductions specified by the
Comptroller General. § 252. There follows a period during

85-1377, 85-1378 & 85-1379--0PINION
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which Congress may by legislation reduce spending to obviate, in whole or in part, the need for the sequestration order.
If such reductions are not enacted, the sequestration order
becomes effective and the spending reductions included in
that order are made.
Anticipating constitutional challenge to these procedures,
the Act also contains a "fallback" deficit reduction process to
take effect "[i]n the event that any of the reporting procedures described in § 251 are invalidated." § 274(f). Under
these provisions, the report prepared by the Directors of
OMB and the CBO is submitted directly to a specially-created Temporary Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction,
which must report in five days to both Houses a joint resolution setting forth the content of the Directors' report. Congress then must vote on the resolution under special rules,
which render amendments out of order. If the resolution is
passed and signed by the President, it then serves as the
basis for a Presidential sequestration order.
B

Within hours of the President's signing of the Act, 1
Congressman Synar, who had voted against the Act, filed a
complaint seeking declaratory relief that the Act was unconstitutional. Eleven other Members later joined Congressman Synar's suit. A virtually identical lawsuit was also filed
by the National Treasury Employees Union. The Union
alleged that its members had been injured as a result of the
Act's automatic spending reduction provisions, which have
suspended certain cost-of-living benefit increases to the
Union's members. 2
1
In his signing statement, the President expressed his view that the Act
was constitutionally defective because of the Comptroller General's ability
to exercise supervisory authority over the President. Statement on Signing H. J . Res. 372 Into Law, 21 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 1491 (1985).
2
An individual member of the Union was later added as a plaintiff. See
Journal OT '85, p. 502.
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A three-judge District Court, appointed pursuant to 2
U. S. C. § 922(a)(5), invalidated the reporting provisions.
Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D DC 1986)
(Scalia, Johnson, Gasch, JJ.). The District Court concluded
that the Union had standing to challenge the Act since the
members of the Union had suffered actual injury by suspension of certain benefit increases. The District Court also
concluded that Congressman Synar and his fellow Members
had standing under the so-called "Congressional standing"
doctrine. See, Barnes v. Kline, 759 F. 2d 21, 41 (CADC
1985), cert. granted, No. 85-781 (March 3, 1986).
The District Court next rejected appellees' challenge that
the Act violated the delegation doctrine. The court expressed no doubt that the Act delegated broad authority, but
delegation of similarly broad authority has been upheld in
past cases. The District Court observed that in Y akus v.
United States, 321 U. S. 414, 420 (1944) this Court upheld a
statute that delegated to an unelected "Price Administrator"
the power "to promulgate regulations fixing prices of commodities." Moreover, in the District Court's view, the Act
adequately confined the exercise of administrative discretion.
The District Court concluded that "the totality of the Act's
standards, definitions, context, and reference to past administrative practice provides an adequate 'intelligible principle'
to guide and confine administrative decisionmaking." 626 F.
Supp., at 1389.
Although the District Court concluded that the Act survived a delegation doctrine challenge, it held that the role of
the Comptroller General in the deficit reduction process
violated the separation of powers doctrine. The court first
explained that the Comptroller General exercises executive
functions under the Act. However, the Comptroller General, while appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, is removable not by the President but
only by a Congressional joint resolution or by impeachment.
The District Court reasoned that this arrangement could not
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be sustained under this Court's decisions in Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), and Humphrey's Executor v.
United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935). Under the separation
of powers established by the Framers of the Constitution,
the court concluded, Congress may not retain the power of
removal over an officer performing executive functions. The
Congressional removal power created a "here-and-now subservience" of the Comptroller General to Congress. 602 F.
Supp., at 1392. The District Court therefore held that
"since the powers conferred upon the Comptroller General as part of the automatic deficit reduction process are
executive powers, which cannot constitutionally be exercised by an officer removable by Congress, those powers
cannot be exercised and therefore the automatic deficit
reduction process to which they are are central cannot be
implemented."
/d., at 1403.
Appeals were taken directly to this Court pursuant to
We noted probable jurisdiction and expedited consideration of the appeals. 475 U. S. - - (1986).
We affirm.
II
§ 274(b) of the Act.

A threshold issue is whether the Members of Congress,
members of the National Treasury Employees Union, or the
Union itself have standing to challenge the constitutionality
of the Act in question. It is clear that members of the
Union, one of whom is an appellee here, will sustain injury
by not receiving a scheduled increase in benefits. See
§ 252(a)(6)(C)(i); 602 F. Supp., at 1381. This is sufficient to
confer standing under § 274(a)(2) and Article III. We therefore need not consider the standing issue as to the Union or
Members of Congress. See Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U. S. 312, 319 n. 3 (1984). Cf. International
Union, UAW v. Brock, - - U.S. - - (1986); Burke v.

;
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Accordingly, we turn to the merits of the
III

We noted recently that "[t]he Constitution sought to divide
the delegated powers of the new Federal Government into
three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial." INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 951 (1983). The
declared purpose of separating and dividing the powers of
government, of course, was to "diffuse power the better to
secure liberty." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice
Jackson's words echo the famous warning of Montesquieu,
quoted by James Madison in The Federalist No. 47, that
"'there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive
powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates
. . . . "' The Federalist No. 47, p. 325 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Even a cursory examination of the Constitution reveals the
influence of Montesquieu's thesis that checks and balances
were the foundation of a structure of government that would
protect liberty. The Framers provided a vigorous legislative branch and a separate and wholly independent executive
branch, with each branch responsible ultimately to the people. The Framers also provided for a judicial branch equally
independent with "[t]he judicial Power ... extend[ing] to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution
and the laws of the United States." Art. III, § 2.
Other, more subtle, examples of separated powers are evident as well. Unlike parliamentary systems such as that of
Great Britain, no person who is an officer of the United
States may serve as a Member of the Congress. Art. I, § 6.
Moreover, unlike parliamentary systems, the President,
under Article II, is responsible not to the Congress but to the
people, subject only to impeachment proceedings which are
exercised by the two Houses as representatives of the people. Art. II, § 4. And even in the impeachment of a President the presiding officer of the ultimate tribunal is not a
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member of the legislative branch, but the Chief Justice of the
United States. Art I, § 2.
That this system of division and separation of powers is
productive of conflicts, confusion, and discordance at times is
inherent, but it was deliberately so structured to assure full,
vigorous and open debate on the great issues affecting the
people and to provide avenues for the operation of checks on
the exercise of governmental power.
·
The Constitution does not contemplate that the President
alone will "faithfully execute" the laws. Article II, § 2 provides that the President
"shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States ...
which shall be established by Law; but the Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."
The Constitution does not expressly refer to removal of Officers of the United States, other than in the impeachment provision, article II, § 4. Undoubtedly, however, the draftsmen
of the Constitution recognized that a President could not fulfill his Constitutional duties without the power to remove any
of his officers who failed to execute his policies faithfully.
The commissions issued to many of the major executive officers have recited that the holder serves "during the pleasure
of the President."
The President's removal power was a subject of debate in
the First Congress in 1789. Congress considered an amendment to a bill establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs;
the bill as then drafted provided that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs was "to be removable from the office by the
President." James Madison, among others, urged the deletion of those words because "these words carry with them an
implication that the Legislature has the power of granting
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the power of removal." 1 Annals of Gong. 581 (1789). Madison argued:
"If there is any point in which the separation of the Legislative and Executive powers ought to be maintained
with greater caution, it is that which relates to the officers and offices .... The Legislature creates the offices,
defines the powers, limits its duration, and annexes a
compensation.
This done, the Legislative Power
ceases."
Id., at 581-582. See generally Myers, supra, 272 U. S., at
111-136. The amendment was agreed to, and
"there is not the slightest doubt, after an examination of
the record, that the vote was, and was intended to be, a
legislative declaration that the power to remove officers
appointed by the President and the Senate vested in the
President alone . . . . "
Myers, supra, 272 U. S., at 114.

Such a declaration from "the first Congress assembled under
the Constitution, many of whose members had taken part in
framing that instrument, . . . is contemporaneous and
weighty evidence of its true meaning."' Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 790 (1983). 3
3
The First Congress included 17 members who had been delegates to
the Philadelphia Convention:
IN THE SENATE
John Langdon (New Hampshire)
Richard Bassett (Delaware)
Robert Morris (Pennsylvania)
Pierce Butler (South Carolina)
William Paterson (New Jersey)
William Few (Georgia)
George Read (Delaware)
William Samuel Johnson
Rufus King (New York)
(Connecticut)
IN THE HOUSE
Nicholas Gilman (New Hampshire)
Abraham Baldwin (Georgia)
James Madison (Virginia)
Daniel Carroll (Maryland)
Roger Sherman (Connecticut)
George Clymer (Pennsylvania)
Thomas FitzSimmons (Pennsylvania) Hugh Williamson (North Carolina)
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The Court revisited this subject in Myers v. United States,
272 U. S. 52 (1925). In Myers, this Court emphatically reaffirmed the sole power of a President to remove his officers
even though their initial appointment was subject to the approval of the Senate. The statute at issue in Myers provided
that certain postmasters could be removed only "by and with
the consent of the Senate," and that provision was held unconstitutional as impinging on Executive authority.
In Myers, Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Court, acknowledged the obvious practical reality that
"the President alone and unaided could not execute the
laws. He must execute them by the assistance of subordinates. This view has since been repeatedly affirmed
by this Court. Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Peters 498, 513;
United States v. Eliason, 16 Peters 291, 302; Williams
v. United States, 1 How. 290, 297; Cunningham v.
Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, 63; Russell v. United States, 261
U. S. 514, 523. As he is charged specifically to take
care care that they are faithfully executed, the reasonable implication, even in the absence of express words,
was that as part of his executive power he should select
those who were to act for him under his direction in the
execution of the laws."
272 U. S., at 117-118.
The Court further held that
"Article II grants to the President the executive power
of the Government, i. e., the general administrative control of those executing the laws, including the power of
appointment and removal of executive officers-a conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed; ... to hold otherwise would
make it impossible for the President, in case of political
or other differences with the Senate or Congress, to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed."
272 U. S., at 163-164.
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The holding in Humphrey's Executors v. United States,
295 U. S. 602 (1935), is wholly consistent with the Court's
holding in Myers, and the Humphrey's Executors Court took
pains to distinguish the Myers decision. See 295 U. S., at
627. 4 Justice Sutherland, speaking for a unanimous Court,
also underscored the crucial role of separated powers in our
system:
"The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the
three general departments of government entirely free
from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect,
of either of the others, has often been stressed and is
hardly open to serious question. So much is implied in
the very fact of the separation of the powers of these
departments by the Constitution; and in the rule which
recognizes their essential co-equality. The sound application of a principle that makes one master in his own
house precludes him from imposing his control in the
house of another who is master there."
295 U. S., at 629-630.
Only recently this Court reaffirmed the teaching of Myers
that the President has "supervisory and policy responsibilities of the utmost discretion and sensitivity ... and management of the Executive Branch-a task for which 'imperative'
reasons requir[e] an unrestricted [Presidential] power to remove the most important of his subordinates .... " Nixon
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 749, 750 (1982) (quoting Myers,
supra, 272 U. S., at 134-135).
Thus, from 1789 to the present, it has been recognized that
the President's authority to direct his subordinates is en'The instant case is also distinguishable from Humphrey's Executors,
which involved restrictions on the President's power to remove an officer
the Court found to be "wholly disconnected from the executive department." 295 U. S., at 630. In contrast, the present case presents no questions involving restrictions of the President's power of removal. It is undisputed that the Comptroller General is removable not by the President,
but only by Congress.
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forced through the power of removal. Given the vast
growth of government, the authority of the President today
to remove an officer of the Executive Branch appointed by
him is even more crucial to the management of the government and execution of the laws than it was at the inception of
the government when that authority was defined by the first
Congress in 1789. A modern President must depend upon
liter·ally thousands of subordinates to give effect to the President's policies with fidelity. A subordinate of the Executive
Branch who fails because of incompetence or want of experience-or is in disagreement with a President's policy-must
be subject to replacement promptly if a President's policies
are to be given effect. In no other way can the affairs of a
complex, modern government of divided power be conducted.
Just as Members of the House and Senate must have staffs
who will faithfully carry out the policies of that Member, a
President can have no less.
Under our system of separated powers, then, because the
power of removal over Executive Branch officers resides in
the President, Congress may not retain the sole power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws.
To do so would directly intrude on the President's obligations
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Art.
II, § 3. The Constitution grants Congress "[a]ll legislative
Powers," Art. I, § 1, but the enforcement of the laws Congress enacts is left to the President. To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only to
Congress would, in practical terms, allow Congress to retain
control over the execution of the laws. This is precisely the
type of aggrandizement by one branch of Government that
our Constitutional scheme was designed to prevent. With
these principles in mind, we turn to consideration of the
nature of the office of the Comptroller General.
IV
The Comptroller General heads the General Accounting

'.
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Office, "an instrumentality of the United States Government
independent of the executive departments," 31 U. S. C.
§ 702(a), which was created by Congress in 1921 as part of the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 43 Stat. 23. Congress
created the office because it believed that it "needed an officer responsible to it alone, to check upon the application of
public funds in accordance with appropriations." H. Mansfield, The Comptroller General: A Study in the Law and
Practice of Financial Administration 65 (1939).
It is clear that Congress has consistently viewed the
Comptroller General as an officer of the Legislative Branch.
The Reorganization Acts of 1945 and 1949, for example, both
stated that the Comptroller General and the GAO are "a part
of the legislative branch of Government." 59 Stat. 616; 63
Stat. 205. Similarly, in the Accounting and Audit Act of
1950, Congress required the Comptroller General to conduct
audits "as an agent of the Congress." 64 Stat. 835.
Over the years, the Comptroller General's have also
viewed themselves as part of the Legislative Branch. In one
of the early Annual Reports of Comptroller General, the official seal of his office was described as reflecting:
"the independence of judgment to be exercised by the
General Accounting Office, subject to the control of the
legislative branch . . . . The combination represents an
agency of the Congress independent of other authority
auditing and checking the expenditures of Government
as required by law and subjecting any questions arising
in that connection to quasi-judicial determination."
Annual Report of the General Accounting Office, 1924,
pp. 5-6.
Comptroller General Warren later testified that: "During
most of my public life, ... I have been a member of the
Legislative Branch. Even now, although heading a great
agency, it is an agency of the Congress, and I am an agent of
Congress." To Provide for the Reorganization of Agencies
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of the Government: Hearings on H. R. 3325 Before the House
Comm. on Expenditures, 79th Gong., 1st Sess. 69 (1945)
(emphasis added). And, in one conflict during Comptroller
General McCarl's tenure, he asserted his independence of the
Executive Branch, stating:
"Congress . . . is . . . the only authority to which there
lies an appeal from the decision of this office. . . . I may
not accept the opinion of any official, inclusive of the Attorney General, as controlling my duty under the law."
2 Comp. Gen. 784 (1923) (disregarding conclusion of the
Attorney General, 33 Ops. Att'y Gen. 476 (1923) with respect to interpretation of compensation statute).
That the role and functions of the Office of Comptroller
General of the United States have long been identified with
the legislative branch in popular and political perception is, of
course, not dispositive. The critical aspects lie in the statute
defining the Comptroller General's office. The Comptroller
General, is nominated by the President from a list of three
individuals recommended by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, see 31 U. S. C. §703(a)(2), and confirmed by the Senate.
The Comptroller General is, however, not removable by the
President but only by Congress itself. He may be removed
"at any time" by a Joint Resolution of Congress resting on
any one of the following bases:
(i) permanent disability; (ii) inefficiency; (iii) neglect of
duty; (iv) malfeasance; or (v) a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude."
31 U. S. C. § 703(e)(l) (1982). 5
' We reject appellants argument that consideration of the effect of a
removal provision is not "ripe" until that provision is actually used . As
the District Court concluded, "it is the Comptroller General's presumed desire to avoid removal by pleasing Congress ... which creates the hereand-now subservience to another branch that raises separation-of-powers
problems." 602 F . Supp., at 1392.

85-1377, 85-1378 & 85-1379-0PINION

14

BOWSHER v. SYNAR

This prov1s10n was included, as one Congressman explained in urging passage of the Act, because Congress "felt
that [the Comptroller General] should be brought under the
sole control of Congress, so that Congress at the moment
when it found he was inefficient and was not carrying on the
duties of his office as he should and as the Congress expected,
could remove him without the long, tedious process of a trial
by impeachment." 61 Gong. Rec. 1081 (1921) (Rep. Byrns).
Thus, we see no escape from the conclusion that, because
Congress has retained sole removal authority over the Comptroller General, he is not an officer of the Executive Branch.
Accordingly, Myers dictates that the Comptroller General
may not be entrusted with executive powers. We must
therefore determine whether the Comptroller General has
been assigned such powers in the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.

v
The primary responsibility of the Comptroller General
under the instant Act is the preparation a "report." This
report must contain detailed estimates of projected federal
revenues and expenditures. The report must also specify
the reductions, if any, necessary to reduce the deficit to the
target for the appropriate fiscal year. The reductions must
be set forth on a program-by-program basis.
In preparing the report, the Comptroller General is to
have "due regard" for the estimates and reductions set forth
in a joint report submitted to him by the Director of CBO and
the Director of OMB, the President's fiscal and budgetary
expert. However, the Act plainly contemplates that the
Comptroller General will exercise his independent judgment
and evaluation with respect to those estimates. The Act
also provides that the Comptroller General's report "shall
explain fully any differences between the contents of such report and the report of the Directors." § 251(b)(2)(B).
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It is clear that these functions of the Comptroller General
constitute the performance of duties explicitly conferred by
the Constitution on the President to execute laws enacted by
Congress. Exercising judgment concerning facts that affect
the application of the law is precisely the type of action performed by the President through officers appointed by him
charged with implementing a statute. Interpreting a law
enacted by Congress is a duty expressly placed by the Constitution, in the first instance, on the President by the mandate of Article II, § 3, that the President "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed."
The executive nature of the Comptroller General's functions under the Act is revealed in § 252(a)(3):
"The [Presidential] order must provide for reductions in
the manner specified in section 251(a)(3), must incorporate the provisions of the [Comptroller General's] report
submitted under section 251(b), and must be consistent
with such report in all respects. The President may not
modify or recalculate any of the estimates, determinations, specifications, bases, amounts, or percentages set
forth in the report submitted under section 251(b) in
determining the reductions to be specified in the order
with respect to programs, projects, and activities, or
with respect to budget activities, within an account
.... " (emphasis added).
The Act thus commands the President himself to carry out,
without the slightest variation, the directive of the Comptroller General as to the reductions to be made. Under the Act,
the President has no choice or voice and (with exceptions not
relevant to the Constitutional issues presented) no opportunity to exercise judgment with respect to those reductions. 6
A further example is provided by § 251(d)(3)(A) of the Act. Under
this provision, the President can terminate certain defense contracts and
shift the monies thus saved to other defense needs. However, under
§ 251(d)(3)(B) the President can do that only if the Comptroller General
certifies that the President has accurately assessed the relevant financial
6

85-1377, 85-1378 & 85-1379--0PINION
16

BOWSHER v. SYNAR

It is apparent, then, that Congress has placed executive
power in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal
only by Congress. The plain language of § 251 of the Act
requires the Comptroller General to perform functions and
duties and to make decisions binding on the President with
respect to duties which the Constitution entrusts to the President. This the Constitution will not permit. 7

VI
We now turn to the final issue of remedy. Appellants
urge that rather than striking down § 251 and invalidating the
significant powers Congress vested in the the Comptroller
General, we should take the lesser course of nullifying the
statutory provisions of the 1921 Act that authorizes Congress
to remove of the Comptroller General. The effect of this
would be to make the Comptroller General removable by the
President, and appellants suggest that this is the result Congress would prefer. However, to follow that course, the
Court would be obliged to decide which of two important provisions enacted by Congress, i. e., § 251 or 31 U. S. C.
703(e)(1), should prevail. We have already concluded that
the 1921 Act contemplates and intended the Comptroller
General to be an officer of Congress subservient to its will.
Thus appellant's argument would require this Court to
undertake a weighing of the importance Congress-in 1921attached to the removal provisions, as well as in other subsequent enactments, 8 against the importance it placed on the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.
considerations. Plainly the Act empowers the Comptroller General to
overrule the judgment of the President as to how the law is to be executed-in this example, as to a matter of national defense.
7
Because we conclude that the Comptroller General may not exercise
the powers conferred upon him by the Act, we have no occasion for considering appellees' other challenge to the Act: that the assignment of powers
to the Comptroller General violates the delegation doctrine, see, e. g.,
A. L . A . Schechter Poultry Corp . v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
8
See, e. g., 2 U. S. C. A. § 687 (West. 1985) (duty to bring suit to require release of impounded budget authority); 42 U. S. C. § 6384(a) (1982)
(duty to impose civil penalties under the Energy Policy and Conservation
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Severance at this late date of the removal provisions enacted 65 years ago would significantly alter the role of the
Comptroller General's role by making him subservient to the
Executive Branch. Recasting the Comptroller General as
an officer of the Executive Branch would alter the balance
that Congress had in mind in drafting the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act, to say nothing of the
wide array of other tasks and duties Congress has assigned
the Comptroller General in other statutes.
Fortunately, this is a thicket we need not enter. In
§ 274(f), Congress has explicitly provided "fallback" provisions in the Act itself that take effect "[i]n the event that any
of the reporting procedures described in section 251 are invalidated," § 274(f)(1). The fallback provisions are "'fully
operative as a law,"' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 108
(1976) (quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U. S. 210, 234 (1932). Thus, assuming appellants are correct in urging that this matter must be resolved
on the basis of Congressional intent, the intent appears to
have been for § 274(f) to be given effect as written.
VII
We conclude the District Court correctly held that the
powers vested in the Comptroller General under § 251 violate
the command of the Constitution that the President "shall
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."
This judgment is stayed for a period not to exceed 60 days
to permit Congress to implement the fallback provisions.

Act of 1975); 15 U. S. C. § 1862 (1982) (member of Chrysler Corporation
Loan Guarantee Board); 45 U. S. C. § 711(d)(1)(C) (1982), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 98-181, tit. II, § 2003(c)(l), 9 Stat. 1297 (1983) (member of
Board of Directors of United States Railway Association); 31 U. S. C. A.
§§ 3551-56 (West. Supp. 1985) (authority to consider bid protests under
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984).
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Sincerely,

T.M.

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

Jluprtmt Of&tnrl of tlr~ ~nitt~ i'bdt•

••Jrinllhm. ~. Of.

2llbi.ll~

CHAMSERS 01"

..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 2, 1986

Re:

85-1377
Bowsher v. Synar
85-1378 - United States Senate v. Synar
85-1379 - O'Neill v. Synar

Dear Chief:
As I read your opinion, you propose to hold that the
functions assigned to the Comptroller General must be
assigned to an officer removable by the President of the
United States. I do not agree with this rationale and will
not be able to join your opinion unless it is substantially
revised.
It was my understanding of the consensus at Conference
that the rationale of the decision was that the function
performed by the Comptroller General could not be performed
by an arm of the Legislature unless Congress itself
performed that function by the normal process of legislating
described in Chadha. In other words, the central rationale
should rest on Chadha rather than Myers. I think your
pinion casts substantial doubt on the legal status of
ndependent agencies and that it would be a serious mistake
or the Court to adopt this approach.
If others do not agree, I shall of course be writing
separately.

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.Su.prtntt <!fltlttt af tlft ~tb ,i\tafts
1tulfing~ ~. <!f. 20gt'l-~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

/

June 3, 1986
Re:

No. 85-1377)
85-1378)
85-1379)

Bowsher v. Synar
United States Senate v. Synar
O'Neill v. Synar

Dear Chief,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc:

The . Conference

June 3, 1986

85-1377 Bowsher v. Synar

Dear Chief:
On the basis of a ore1iminRry reading of vour op'nion, 1 share generally the views expressed by other Justices

who have written you.
1 could not ioin an opinion that casts substantial
doubt on the constitutionality of the independent aqencies,
and do not think the vote at Confprqnce supports such a
vi e\'-7.
It is nevertheless helpful tn have a draft of this
important opinion early in June, and 1 fully agree as to the
desirability of our sp@akinq "with one voice."

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
:Lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

.:iu.prmtt Qtltlttt of tqt ~b .;italtg

Jfaglfi:nghtn. ~. <q. 20.?J!..;J
Juen 3, 1986

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

RE:

85-1377) - Bowsher v. Synar
85-1378) - U.S. Senate v. Synar
85-1379) - O'Neill v. SynaE

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

You have all received memos now commenting on rny
first draft in the aoav
ase.
As I think you are aware,
this was a '~ ush job" bu one on which I had been giving
a good deal of thought efore the writing began.
Indeed, I find nothing to disagree with in any of the)
four memos I have received, and I will have a second draft
out as soon as I clear the decks from my two-day meeting
with the Federal Judicial Cen r.

vJuw !

~tmt Qicnri cf tift ~b .itaus

..uJtinghtn. J. Qi.

211.?,.~

CHAMISERS 01"

.JUSTICE

w .. .

.J . BRENNAN, .JR.

June 3, 1986

Bowsher v. Synar
Nos. 85-1377, -1378, -1379
Dear Chief,
I agree with what has been said by Sandra, John and Thurgood
that the reasoning of the opinion in this case must be that
Congress cannot retain the power to remove an officer charged
with executing the law, and that the opinion should not rely on
the rationale that the President must have power to remove such
officers. Moreover, I think it very important that the opinion
explain the basis and importance of this distinction, since it is
only by doing so that we shall make clear that we are not
questioning the viability of independent agencies.
The phrase "separation of powers" broadly describes a number
of distinct concerns that are embodied in the framework of our
Government. The most basic and important of these is expressed
by Montesquieu's famous maxim: that the power to legislate, the
power to execute, and the power to adjudicate be controlled by
separate entities. Whether this separation has been observed
does not depend upon the formal designation of an officer as
being within one or another branch of Government. Rather, it
depends upon which branch holds the power actually to control
that officer. Congress cannot retain the power directly to
control an officer to whom it has delegated the task of executing
a law whether that officer is formally designated an officer of
the legislature or of the executive branch. Moreover, as the
Framers correctly understood (and we have elevated this
understanding to the status of constitutional presumption), the
power to control is conferred by the power to remove. Thus, to
the extent that Congress retains the power to remove a particular
officer, it possesses the power to control that officer's
performance. It is for this reason, and not because the power to
remove is somehow "inherently executive" that the power to remove
is entangled in separation of powers questions.
A distinct "separation of powers" issue concerns the
Framers' choice to place execution of the law under the control
of a single President accountable to the entire nation. However,
while the decision to have a unitary executive is generally
included under the "separation of powers" rubric, it reflects
concerns that are different from those that motivated the Framers
to separate the powers of legislation, execution and
adjudication: the Framers created three independent branches
primarily because they feared that tyranny would result if too
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much political control became concentrated in a single entity;
the Framers established a unitary executive primarily to ensure
more efficient and accountable government. Thus, while a law
qualifying the President's power to remove implicates
constitutional concerns, the concerns implicated are different
from those implicated if Congress retains removal power itself.
Myers and Humphrey's Executors can be understood in light of
this distinction. In Myers, Congress retained power to
participate in the removal process by requiring Senate approval
for the removal of an officer performing executive functions.
This gave Congress direct control over an officer executing the
law and thus violated the fundamental precept that Congress not
control execution in addition to legislation. In Humphrey's
Executors, on the other hand, Congress did not itself participate
in the removal process, but simply limited the President's power
to remove at will. In upholding the provisions for removal of
FTC Commissioners, Humphrey's Executors made clear that the
dictum in Myers suggesting that the President's removal power
must remain unfettered was incorrect.
My concern is that by not making the distinction between
Myers and Humphrey's Executors express, the opinion will give
credence to the view--strongly suggested by the District Court-that Humphrey's Executors was wrong and that the Myers dictum was
correct. I think that the opinion in this case must expressly
draw the distinction between Congress having the power to remove
and the President not having that power, and must clearly explain
that our decision is based solely on the fact that Congress has
removal power (and thus control over) the officer charged with
executing the Budget Deficit Act.
I think that the opinion also should reaffirm the holding in
Humphrey's Executors that Congress can create independent
agencies (i.e., agencies staffed by officers not removable at the
President's pleasure). The District Court opinion includes a lot
of dictum that questions the continuing validity of Humphrey's
Executors. This dictum is simply wrong. The notion that
Congress can to some extent limit the President's power to remove
as long as Congress does not itself participate in the removal
process is no longer open to question. Indeed, the First
Congress limited the President's power to remove the Comptroller
two weeks after the so-called "Decision of 1789." In addition,
the ICC, the United States Shipping Board (now the Federal
Maritime Commission), the FTC, and perhaps other independent
agencies, were created by the Congress long before our decision
in Humphrey's Executors. Finally, even were there some reason to
doubt the strength of the conclusion in Humphrey's Executors, a
very large part of Government has been developed in reliance on
that decision, and so the force of stare decisis is very
powerful.

-3-

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.h.prmu OJ&nni &tf tltt ~~ !ltatt•
)la.~n. J.

OJ.
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CHAMBERS 01"

THE CHIEF" JUSTICE

June 4, 1986

Re:

85-1377;1378;1379 - Bowsher v. Synar, etc.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

After reviewing carefully the various comments and memos,
I conclude the essence of the problem is whether we skin the
tiger from the neck to the tail or vice versa. Either way suits me,
and the printer is now turning the tirJer around. The hide, however,
will look the same - at least as I Sbe it.

(/1
/

To: Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES THROUGHOUT

From:

Brennan
White
Marshall
Blackmun
Powell
Rehnquist
Stevens
O'Connor

The Chief Justice
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CHARLES A. BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANT
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v.
MIKE SYNAR, MEMBER OF
CONGRESS, ET AL.
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v.
MIKE SYNAR, MEMBER OF
CONGRESS, ET AL.
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THOMAS P. O'NEILL, JR., SPEAKER OF THE UNITED
STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
ET AL., APPELLANTS

85-1379
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UNITED STATES SENATE, APPELLANT

85-1378

};o -·

/'___.-_._ . . . .

v.
MIKE SYNAR, MEMBER OF
CONGRESS, ET AL.

ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[June-, 1986]

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The question presented on these appeals is whether the
assignment by Congress to the Comptroller General of the
United States of certain functions under the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 violates the doctrine of separation of powers.

~·
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I
A
On December 12, 1985, the President signed into law the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037, popuiarly known as the
"Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act." The purpose of the Act is
to eliminate the federal budget deficit. To that end, the Act
sets a "maximum deficit amount" for federal spending for
each of fiscal years 1986 through 1991. The size of that maximum deficit amount progressively reduces to zero in fiscal
year 1991. If in any fiscal year the federal budget deficit exceeds the maximum deficit amount by more than a specified
sum, the Act requires across-the-board cuts in federal spending to reach the targeted deficit level, with half of the cuts
made in defense programs and the other half made to nondefense programs. The Act exempts certain priority programs from these cuts. § 255.
These "automatic" reductions are accomplished through a
rather complicated procedure, spelled out in § 251, the socalled "reporting provisions" of the Act. Each year, the
Directors of the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB")
and the Congressional Budget Office ("CEO") independently
estimate the amount of the federal budget deficit for the
upcoming fiscal year. If that deficit exceeds the maximum
targetted deficit amount for that fiscal year by more than a
specified amount, the Directors of OMB and CEO independently calculate, on a program-by-program basis, the budget
reductions necessary to ensure that the deficit does not exceed the maximum deficit amount. The Act then requires
the Directors to report jointly their deficit estimates and
budget reduction calculations to the Comptroller General.
The Comptroller General, after reviewing the Directors'
reports, then reports his conclusions to the President.
§ 251(b). The President in turn must issue a "sequestration"
order mandating the spending reductions specified by the
Comptroller General. § 252. There follows a period during
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which Congress may by legislation reduce spending to obviate, in whole or in part, the need for the sequestration order.
If such reductions are not enacted, the sequestration order
becomes effective and the spending reductions included in
that order are made.
Anticipating constitutional challenge to these procedures,
the Act also contains a "fallback" deficit reduction process to
take effect "[i]n the event that any of the reporting procedures described in § 251 are invalidated." § 274(f). Under
these provisions, the report prepared by the Directors of
OMB and the CEO is submitted directly to a speciallycreated Temporary Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction,
which must report in five days to both Houses a joint resolution setting forth the content of the Directors' report. Congress then must vote on the resolution under special rules,
·which render amendments out of order. If the resolution is
passed and signed by the President, it then serves as the
basis for a Presidential sequestration order.
B

Within hours of the President's signing of the Act, 1
Congressman_§m_ar, who had voted against the Act, filed a
complaint seeking declaratory relief that the Act was unconstitutional. El ven other
mbers later joined
gressman Synar's suit. A virtually igent1ca g,wsuit was also filed
by ~ional Treasury Employees Union. The Union
alleged that its members had been injured as a result of the
Act's automatic spending reduction provisions, which have
suspended certain cost-of-living benefit increases to the
Union's members. 2
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A three-judge District Court, appointed pursuant to 2
U. S. C. § 922(a)(5), invalidated the reporting provisions.
Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D DC 1986)
(Scalia, Johnson, Gasch, JJ.). The District Court concluded
that the Union had standing to challenge the Act since the
members o~ suffered actual injury by suspension of certain benefit increases. The District Court also
concluded that Congressman Synar and his fellow Members
had standing under the so-called "Congressional standing"
doctrine. See, Barnes v. Kline, 759 F. 2d 21, 41 (CADC
1985)) t;ert. granted, No. 85-781 (March 3, 1986).
Th¥'"District Court next rejected appellees' challenge that
the Act violated the delegation doctrine. The court expressed no doubt that the Act delegated broad authority, but
delegation of similarly broad authority has been upheld in
past cases. Thev1Jistrict Court observed that in Yakus v.
United States, 321 U. S. 414, 420 (1944) this Court upheld a
statute that delegated to an unelected "Price Administrator"
the power "to promulgate regulations fixing prices of commodities." Moreover, in the---District Court's view, the Act
adequately confined the exercise of administrative discretion.
The District Court concluded that "the totality of the Act's (
standards, definitions, context, and reference to past administrative practice provides an adequate 'intelligible principle'
to guide and confine administrative decisionmaking." 626 F.
Supp., at 1389.
Although the District Court concluded that the Act survived a delegation doctrine challenge, ~~e of
the omptro er enera m t e deficit reauction process
violate t e separatiOn of powers doctrine.
he court first
expl ·
at t e Comptroller eneral exercises executive
functions under the Act. However, the Comptroller General, while appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, is removable not by the Pre§.ident_ but
onlz_ by a ~'i.ionaUillnt re~lB.~by impeachment.
The District Court reasoned that this' arrangement could not

..
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be sustained under this Court's dec~ions in Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), and 1Iumphrey's Executor v.
United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935). Under the separation
of powers established by the Framers of the Constitution,
the court concluded, Congress may not retain the power of
removal over an officer performing executive functions. The
Congressional removal power created a "here-and-now subservience" of the Comptroller General to Congress. 602 F.
Supp., at 1392. The istrict Court therefore held that

I~

"since the owers conferred u on the Comptroller Gener.alas part of the automatic deficit re uction process are
e~v~ .e~wers, which cannot constitutionally be exercised by ailomcer removable by Congress, those powers
1
eficit
cannot be exercised and therefore the auto
reduction process to which they are are central cannot be
implemented:"
-~
I d.,
1403.

at

Appeals were taken directly to this Court pursuant to
§ 274(b) of the Act. We noted probable jurisdiction and expedited consideration of the appeals. 475 U. S. - - (1986).
We affirm.

n ·

is whether the Members of Congress,
members o the ational Treasury Employees Union, or the
Union itself have standing to challenge the constitutionality
of the Act in question. It is clear that members of the
Union, one of whom is an appellee here, will sustain injury
by not receiving a scheduled increase in benefits. See
§ 252(a)(6)(C)(i); 602 F. Supp., at 1381. This is sufficient to
confer standing under§ 274(a)(2) and Article III. We therefore need not consider the standing issue as to the Union or
Members of Congress. See Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U. S. 312, 319 n. 3 (1984). Cf. International
Union, UAW v. Brock, - - U.S. - - (1986); Burke v.

:5:~~~
_..
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Accordingly, we turn to the merits of the
III

We noted recently that "[t]he Constitution sought to divide
the delegated powers of the new Federal Government into
three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial." INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 951 (1983). The
declared ~oseoTseparating and dividing the powers of
government, of course, ~as t~di~s~ Qo_:ver the better to
secure liberty." Youngstown heet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice
Jackson's words echo the famous warning of Montesquieu,
quoted by James Madison in The Federalist No. 47, that
"'there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive
powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates
... .'" The Federalist No. 47, p. 325 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Even a cursory examination of the Constitution reveals the
influence of Montesquieu's thesis that checks and balances
were the foundation of a structure of government that would
protect liberty. The Framers provided a vigorous legislative branch and a separate and wholly independent executive
branch, with each branch responsible ultimately to the people. The Framers also provided for a judicial branch equally
independent with "[t]he judicial Power . .. extend[ing] to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution
and the laws of the United States." Art. III, § 2.
Other, more subtle, examples ~arated QOWers ar~ evidentas welLUnlike parliamentary systems such as that of
Great Britain, no person w_E.o is_a~d
States ma~ve as a~ of the ~ngress. Art. I, § 6.
Moreover, unTII<e parliamentary systems, the President,
under Article II, is responsible not to the Congress but to the
people, subject only to impeachment proceedings which are
exercised by the two Houses as representatives of the people. Art. II, § 4. And even in the impeachment of a President the presiding officer of the ultimate tribunal is not a

I

-.
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member of the legislative branch, but the Chief Justice of the
United States. Art I, § 2.
That this system of division and separation of powers is
productive of conflicts, confusion, and discordance at times is
inherent, but it was deliberately so structured to assure full,
vigorous and open debate on the great issues affecting the
people and to provide avenues for the operation of checks on
the exercise of governmental power.
The Constitution does not contemplate an active role for
Congress in the supervision of officers charged with the execution of the laws it enacts. The President appoints "Officers of the United States" with the "Advice and Consent of
the Senate .... " Article II, § 2. Once the appointment
has been made and confirmed, however, the Constitution explicitly provides for removal of Officers of the United States
by Congress only upon impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction by the Senate. An impeachment
by the House and trial by the Senate can rest only on "Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Article II, § 4. A direct Congressional role in the removal of
Officers of the United States beyond this limited one is inconsistent with separation of powers.
This was made clear in debate in the First Congress in
1789. When Congress considered an amendment to a bill
establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs, the debate
centered around whether the Congress "should recognize and
declare the power of the President under the Constitution to
remove the Secretary of Foreign Affairs without the advice
and consent of the Senate." Myers, supra, 272 U. S., at
114. James Madison urged rejection of a Congressional role
in the removal of Executive Branch officers, other than by
impeachment, saying in debate:
Perhaps there was no argument urged with more success, or more plausibly grounded against the Constitution, under which we are now deliberating, than that
founded on the mingling of the Executive and Legisla-
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tive branches of the Government in one body. It has
been objected, that the Senate have too much of the Executive power even, by having a control over the President in the appointment to office. Now, shall we extend
this connexion between the Legislative. and Executive
departments, which will strengthen the objection, and
diminish the responsibility we have in the head of the
Executive? 1 Annals of Cong. 380.
Madison's position ultimately prevailed, and a Congressional
role in the removal process was rejected. This "Decision of
1789" provides "contemporaneous and weighty evidence" of
the Constitution's meaning since many of the members of the
first Congress "had taken part in framing that instrument."
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 790 (1983). 3
This Court first directly addressed this issue in Myers v.
United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1925). At issue in Myers was a
statute providing that certain postmasters could be removed
only "by and with the consent of the Senate." The President
removed one such postmaster without Senate approval, and a
lawsuit ensued. Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Court,
declared the statute unconstitutional on the ground that for
Congress to "draw to itself, or to either branch of it, the
power to remove or the right to participate in the exercise of
that power ... would be ... to infringe the constitutional
3
The First Congress included [17] members who had been delegates to
the Philadelphia Convention:
IN THE SENATE
Richard Bassett (Delaware)
John Langdon (New Hampshire)
Pierce Butler (South Carolina)
Robert Morris (Pennsylvania)
William Few (Georgia)
William Paterson (New Jersey)
George Read (Delaware)
William Samuel Johnson
(Connecticut)
Rufus King (New York)
IN THE HOUSE
Abraham Baldwin (Georgia)
Nicholas Gilman (New Hampshire )
Daniel Carroll (Maryland)
James Madison (Virginia)
George Clymer (Pennsylvania)
Roger Sherman (Connecticut)
Thomas FitzSimmons (Pennsylvania) Hugh Williamson (North Carolina)
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principle of the separation of governmental powers." 272
U. S., at 161.
A decade later, in Humphrey's Executors v. United States,
295 U. S. 602 (1935) :rerred upon heavily by appellants, a
Federal Trade Commissioner who had been removed by the
Pres~ay. The relevant statute permitted
re~nt," but only_ "fur inefficien_:y, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." Justice Sutherland,
speakillgror the Court- ;upheld the statute. The Court characterized the Federal Traae CommiSSioner as an officer who
"occupies no place in the executive department and who exercises no part of the executive power vested by the Constitution in the President," but acts only "in the discharge and effectuation of ... quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial powers, or
as an [officer of an] agency of the legislative or judicial departments of the governments." 295 U. S., at 628. As to
such officers, the Court concluded, "illimitable power of removal is not possessed by the President ... ." I d., at 629.
Justice Sutherland's opinion for the Court also underscored
the crucial role of separated powers in our system:
"The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the
three general departments of government entirely free
from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect,
of either of the others, has often been stressed and is
hardly open to serious question. So much is implied in
the very fact of the separation of the powers of these departments by the Constitution; and in the rule which recognizes their essential co-equality."
295 U.S., at 629~ .
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Weiner v. United
States, 357 U. S. 349 (1958), concluding that, under Humphrey's Executors, the President had no unrestrained removal authority over a member of the War Crimes
Commission.
Humphrey's Executors involved an issue not presented
eitherm the Myer~ca~ or in this case-i. e., the ~ower of
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Congress to limit the President's power to remove an officer
"wholly disconnected from the executive department." 295
U. S., at 630.~ At the same time, the Court cast no doubt on
the specific holding of Myers dealing with an executive officer
that a direct Congressional role in the removal of such an officer is improper.
In light of these precedents, we conclude that Congress
cannot reserve for itself the powe~ranomcer
charge Wlt t e execu 1on o the laws except by impeachmen .
o perm1 t e execu wn o t e aws tooe vestea in an
o:ffiC"er answerable only to Congress would, in practical
terms, reserve in Congress control over the execution of the
laws. As the ~ourt observed, "Once an officer is appointed, it is only the~ can remove him, and not
the authority that appointed him, that he must fear and, in
the performance of his functions, obey." 602 F. Supp., at
1401. The structure of the Constitution does not permit )
Congress to execute the laws and it follows Congress cannot
grant to an officer under its control what it does not possess.
Our decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983), supports this conclusion. In Chadha, we strnel£ down a
house "legislative veto" provision by wh1ch each House of

J

one

• Appellants therefore are wide of the mark in arguing that an affirmance in this case requires casting doubt on the status of "independent"
agencies because no issues involving such agencies are presented here.
The statutes establishing independent agencies typically specify either that
the agency members are removable by the President for specified causes,
see, e. g., 15 U. S. C. § 41 (members of the Federal Trade Commission
may be removed by the President "for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office), or else do not specify a removal procedure, see, e. g., 2
U. S. C. § 437c (Federal Election Commission). The issue in this case involves nothing like these statutes, but rather a statute that provides for
direct Congressional involvement-indeed control-over the decision to remove the Comptroller General. Appellants have referred us to no independent agency whose members are removable by the Congress for certain
causes short of impeachable offenses, as is the Comptroller General, see
part IV infra.
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Congress retained the power to reverse a decision Congress
had expressly authorized the Attorney General to make:
"Disagreement with the Attorney General's decision on
Chadha's deportation-that is, Congress' decision to deport Chadha-no less than the Congress' original choice
to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to
make that decision, i11volves determinations of policy
that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral
passage followed by presentment to the President.
Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until
that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked."
462 U. S., at 954-955.
To permit Congress or an officer controlled by Congress to
execute the laws would be, in essence, to permit a Congressional veto. Congress could simply remove, or threaten to
remove, an officer for executing the laws in any fashion found
to be unsatisfactory to Congress. This kind of Congressional
control over the execution of the laws, Chadha makes clear,
is constitutionally impermissible.
The dangers of Congressional usurpation of executive
branch functions have long been recognized. "[T]he debates
of the Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers,
are replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative
Branch of the National Government will aggrandize itself at
the expense of the other two branches." Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U. S., at 129. We have observed only recently "[t]he
hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate
Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted." 462 U. S.,
at 951. With t_!lese pri~ mind, we turn to consideration of the nature offhe office of the Comptroller General.
-------------------------------~
IV
The Comptroller General heads the General Accounting
Office, "an instrumentality of the United States Government
independent of the executive departments," 31 U. S. C.

l
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§ 702(a), which was created by Congress in 1921 as part of the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 43 Stat. 23. Congress
created the office because it believed that it "needed an officer responsible to it alone, to check upon the application of
public funds in accordance with appropriations." H. Mansfield, The Comptroller General: A Study in the Law and
Practice of Financial Administration 65 (1939).
It is clear that Congress has consistently viewed the
Comptroller General as an officer of the Legislative Branch.
The Reorganization Acts of 1945 and 1949, for example, both
stated that the Comptroller General and the GAO are "a part
( of the legislative branch of Government." 59 Stat. 616; 63
Stat. 205. Similarly, i:p the Accounting and Audit Act of
1950, Congress required the Comptroller General to conduct
audits "as an agent of the Congress." 64 Stat. 835.
Over the years, the Co32ptroller Gen~rals have also viewed
themselves as part of the Le 'slative Branch. Inaneof the
early nnu
eports o Comptroller General, the official seal
of his office was described as reflecting:

"the independence of judgment to be exercised by the
General Accounting Office, subject to the control of the
legislative branch . . . . The combination represents an
agency of the Congress independent of other authority
auditing and checking the expenditures of Government
as required by law and subjecting any questions arising
in that connection to quasi-judicial determination."
Annual Report of the General Accounting Office, 1924,
pp. 5-6.
Comptroller GenEal Warren later testified that: "During
most ofmy puolic life, ... I have been a member of the
Legislative Branch. Even now, although heaaTng a great
agency~ency of the Congress, and I am an agent of
Congress." To Provide for the Reorganization of Agencies
of the Government: Hearings on H. R. 3325 Before the House
Comm. on Expenditures, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1945)
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(emphasis added). And, in one conflict during Comptroller
General McCarl's tenure, he asserted his independence of the
Executive Branch, stating:
"Congress ... is ... the only authority to which there
lies an appeal from the decision of this office .... I may
not accept the opinion of any official, inclusive of the Attorney General, as controlling my duty under the law."
2 Comp. Gen. 784 (1923) (disregarding conclusion of the
Attorney General, 33 Ops. Att'y Gen. 476 (1923) with respect to interpretation of compensation statute).
That the role and function of the Office of Comptroller General of the United States since its inception have been identified with the legislative branch in popular and political perception is, of course, not dispositive. The critical aspects lie
in the statute definin the Com troller General's OffiCe. The
Comp ro er General must be nominated by the President
from a list of three individuals recommended by the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, see 31 U. S. C. § 703(a)(2), and confirmed
by the Senate. The Comptroller General is, however, removable only by Congress. He may be removed "at any
time" by a Joint Resolution of Congress resting on any one of
the following bases:
(i) permanent disability; (ii) inefficiency; (iii) neglect of
duty; (iv) malfeasance; or (v) a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude."
31 U. S. C. § 703(e)(1) (1982). 5

--

This provision was included, as one Congressman explained in urging passage of the Act, because Congress "felt
3
We reject appellants argument that consideration of the effect of a
removal provision is not "ripe" until that provision is actually used. As
the District Court concluded, "it is the Comptroller General's presumed desire to avoid removal by pleasing Congress ... which creates the hereand-now subservience to another branch that raises separation-of-powers
problems." 602 F . Supp.·, at 1392.

~~--~~

<:::G-

~

.£., P~.~
~4
j~~

~l/1._;
0

'

~

~~

~

85-1377, 85-1378 & 85-1379-0PINION
14

!

BOWSHER v. SYNAR

that [the Comptroller General] should be brought under the
sole control of Congress, so that Congress at the moment
when it found he was inefficient and was not carrying on the
duties of his office as he should and as the Congress expected,
could remove him without the long, tedious process of a trial
by impeachment." 61 Cong. Rec. 1081 (1921) (Rep. Byrns).
Against this background, we see no esca~om thELconclusion £hat, bec<!:_use Congress ~etain~ removal authority
over-the Comptroller General, he is not an officer of the Exec~tive Branch:- Every authority examineddemonstates
that~troller General may not be entrusted with executive powers. The remaining question is whether the
Comptroller General has been assigned such powers in the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.

~ .·
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The
onsibility of the Comptroller General
under the nstan
1s the preparation a "report." This
report must con am etailed estimates of projected federal
revenues and expenditures. The report must also specify
the reductions, if any, necessary to reduce tfie deficit to the
target for the appropriate fiscal year. The reductions must
be set forth on a program-by-program basis.
In preparing the report, the Comptroller General is to
have "due regard" for the estimates and reductions set forth
in a joint report submitted to him by the Director of CBO and
the Director of OMB, the President's fiscal and budgetary advisor. However, the Act plainly contemplates that the
Comptroller General will exercise his independent judgment
and evaluation with respect to those estimates. The Act
also provides that the Comptroller General's report "shall
explain fully any differences between the contents of such report and the report of the Directors." § 251(b)(2)(B).
-1~ __. _---?..
It is clear that ~ese nc wns of the Comptroller_General .:r-~ ~
constitute e pe ormance of duties exPlicit! conferred b
(;i/Jil ~ ~
the~ it
e re 1 nt to execute laws enacted by ~~
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Congress. Exercising judgi!lent concernin
the a lication
e aw is precise y_ th~ of action. performed by the President through officers am;~ointed by him
char~ting a statute. Interpreting a law
enacte y Congress is a uty expressly placed by the Constitution, in the first instance, on the President by the mandate of Article II, § 3, that tht President "take Care that the
La~s be faithfu!b:.. execpted."
e executive nature of the Comptroller General's functions under the Act is revealed in § 252(a)(3):
"The [Presidential] order must provide for reductions in
the manner specified in section 251(a)(3), must incorporate the provisions of the [Comptroller General's] report
submitted under section 251(b), and must be consistent
with such report in all respects. The President may not
modify or recalculate any of the estimates, determinations, specifications, bases, amounts, or percentages set
forth in the report submitted under section 251(b) in
determining the reductions to be specified in the order
with respect to programs, projects, and activities, or
with respect to budget activities, within an account
.... " (emphasis added).
The ct thus comma ds the President himself to carry out,
without the shg test vanat10n, e~rol
le~he...red!.ll:funs to Qe..~de. Under the Act,
the President has no choice or voice and (with exceptions not
relevant to the Constitutional issues presented) no opportunity to exercise judgment with respect to those reductions. 6
A further example is provided by § 251(d)(3)(A) of the Act. Under
this provision, the President can terminate certain defense contracts and
shift the monies thus saved to other defense needs. However, under
§ 251(d)(3)(B) the President can do that only if the Com troller General
certifies that the Pres1 ent nas accura e y assesse the relevant financial
consideratfons. Plamly tfie Act empowers the Comptrolfer General to
overru"1'e'ffie judgment of the President as to how the law is to be executed-in this example, as to a matter of national defense.
6
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It is apparent, then, tha~t Congress has placed executive
power in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal py
Co~s.
e plain language of §"251 of the Act requires
the Comptroller General to perform functions and to make
decisions binding on the President with respect to duties
which the Constitution entrusts to the President. The Constitution does not pe~.rgaching the boundaries....or separated powers in this fashion. 7

VI
We now turn to the final issue of remedy. Appellants
urge ,that rather than striking down§ 251 and invalidating~the
significant powers Congress vested in the the Comptroller
General to meet a national fiscal emergency, we should take
rov1 10 of the
the lesser course of nullifying the statuto
1921 ct at aut orizes ongress to remove of the Comptroller General. The effect or this would be to make tbe
Comptroller General removable by the President, and appellants suggest that this is the result Congress would prefer.
Ho~r, to follow that C.Q1lrse, the Court would be obliged
to decide which of t o im o ant rov1 ions enacted by Congress,t. e., § 251 or 31 U. S. C. 703(e)(1), should prevail.
We have already concluded that the 1921 Act contemplates
and intended the Comptroller General to be an officer of Congress ultimately subservient to its will. Thus appellant's argument would require this Court to undertake a weighing of
the importance Congress-in 1921-attached to the removal
provisions, as well as in other subsequent enactments, 8
7
Because we conclude that the Comptroller General may not exercise
the powers conferred upon him by the Act, we have no occasion for considering appellees' other challenge to the Act: that the assignment of powers
to th e Comptroller General violates t he delegatiOn doctrine, see, e. g.,
A. L. A. Sclrechter'"I1oulfry Corp. v. United States , 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
8
See, e. g. , 2 U.S. C. A. § 687 (West. 1985) (duty to bring suit torequire release of impounded budget authority); 42 U. S. C. § 6384(a) (1982)
(duty to impose civil penalties under the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act of 1975); 15 U. S. C. § 1862 (1982) (member of Chrysler Corporation
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against the importance it placed on the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.
Severance at this late date of the removal revisions enacte.Q_ 65 years ago would significant y alter the role of the
Comptroller ITeneral's role by making him subservient to the
Executive Branch. Recasting the Comptroller General as
an officer of the Executive Branch would alter the balance
that Congress had in mind in drafting the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act, to say nothing of the
wide array of other tasks and duties Congress has assigned
the Comptroller General in other statutes.
Fortunately, this is a thicket we need n t en r. In
§ 274(f), Congress has explicitly provided fallback' provisions in the Act that take effect "[i]n the event ... any of the
reporting _procedur~s cre·scribed ins ection 251 arej nvalidated," § 274(f)(l). 1 'he f:illbac1C provisions are "'fully
operative as a law,"' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 108
(1976) (quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U. S. 210, 234 (1932). Thus, assuming appellants are correct in urging that this matter must be resolved
on the basis of Congressional intent, the intent appears to
have been for § 274(f) to be given effect as written.

-

VII
No one can doubt that Congress and the President are confronted with fiscal and economic problems of unprecedented
magnitude, but "the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to
the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the
primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of democratic government .... " Chadha, supra, 462 U. 8., at 944.
Loan Guarantee Board); 45 U. S. C. § 71l(d)(l)(C) (1982), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 98-181, tit. II, § 2003(c)(l), 9 Stat. 1297 (1983) (member of
Board of Directors of United States Railway Association); 31 U. S. C. A.
§§ 3551-56 (West. Supp. 1985) (authority to consider bid protests under
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984).
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We conclude the District Court correctly held that the
powers vested in the Comptroller General under § 251 violate
the command of the Constitution that the Congress play no
direct role in the execution of the laws.
This judgment is stayed for a period not to exceed 60 days
to permit Congress to implement the fallback provisions.
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 6, 1986

Re: Nos. 85-1377, 85-1378, 85-1379, Bowsher v. Synar, etc.

Dear Bill:
You memo of June 6 strikes me as trying to decide some cases
not here -- something I hope I generally avoid. At page 10 n.4,
I think I've made it clear we are casting no doubt on the SEC,
FTC, EPA, etc. In short, I can't escape a feeling you want an
opinion for another case.
However, I'll go over your memo closely, see to what extent I
can accommodate your thoughts, and get back to you.
Regards,
•,

Justice Brennan
Copies to Conference
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.JUSTICE

June 6, 1986

BRENNAN, .JR .

Bowsher v. Synar
Nos. 85-1377, -1378, -1379
Dear Chief,
Your second draft does indeed accommodate many of my
concerns. However, I still have problems with sections of the
opi~on that, I am afraid~~ ~t doubt ~9n the
cont · uing viabilit of maEJ--if not all--~ pendent
administrative agencies.
I refer in particular to:
(1) the
descr f pt i on of agency functions as "quasi-legislative" or "quasijudicial" in contradistinction to "executive" functions that only
the President or officers removable at his pleasure , ~~y perform,
and (2) the emphasis on whether an officer or agen ~ s within
the Executive Branch.
With respect to the first of these concerns, as you
explained in Chadha, although we have referred to agency activity
as "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial" in nature, it is still
executive acitivity.
462 u.s. 919, 953, n. 16 (1983). The
importance of this insight is its recognition that the executive
function consists of what Congress leaves to be done in order to
implement the laws it passes. If Congress establishes standards
for clean air in a law, establishing such standards is
legislative; however, if Congress delegates the establishment of
standards to an agency (within t he broad limits imposed by the
nondelegation doctrine), this same task becomes executive. This
is, it seems to me, one reason why overreaching by Congress is
potentially more problematic than overreaching by the other
branches of Government--Congress' power to choose how much to
inc lude in a law and how much to leave to administrators gives
the legislative branch the power to control to a large extent the
duties and functions that will be left to the other branches.

7

My concern is that reintroducing such notions as whether
some function is "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial" will
encourage claims that all sorts of independent agency activity is
neither, and that it must therefore be under the President's
control. In other words, I am afraid that reintroducing this
analysis will cast doubt upon the legality of much of the work of
independent administrative agencies despite disclaimers that the
question is presented. This problem can easily be avoided simply
by not using this terminology in the discussion.

I

With respect to my second concern, I continue to believe
that whether there is a separat i on of powers problem is a
functional question, which depends upon which branch actually
controls an officer charged with particular responsibilities.
However, while labels such as "Legislative Officer" or "Executive

~·
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Officer" are themselves of no functional significance, they may
be misleading. Passages in the opinion--particularly in Part V-appear to suggest that an officer is an "Executive Officer" if he
serves at the pleasure of the President and that officers
performing tasks such as interpreting a law must be "Executive
Officers." The im ortant oint is sim
that the Constitution
prohibits Congress
aving power to contro an o 1cer who
has been de egated exec
v res
1 1es wnether or not that
officer is called an "Executive Officer" or a "Legislative
Officer." I woule prefer avoiding the use of such labels and
instead discuss the issues in terms of whether Congress has
removal power over an officer with executive responsibilities.
These are general concerns, and, as such, are not much help
to you in writing this difficult opinion. I add the following
( specific suggestions in the hope that you will find them more
usef~

First, rather than quoting the language from Humphrey's
Executors, I would simply describe the result in that case.
Thus, I suggest deleting the third through fifth sentences of the
first full paragraph on page 9 and substituting something like
the following:
The Court upheld the statute, holding that
"illimitable power of removal is not possessed by the
President" with respect to certain kinds of
administrative bodies that, like the FTC, were "created
by Congress to carry into effect legislative policies"
embodied in statutory enactments. 295 u.s., at 628629. The Court distinguished Myers, reaffirming its
holding that congressional participation in the removal
process of executive officers is unconstitutional, but
"disapprov[ing]" expressions in that opinion "beyond
the point involved." Id., at 626.
In addition, I would delete the quoted language "wholly
disconnected from the executive department" in the second line on
page 10. If you think that some kind of clause is required at
the end of the sentence, how about something like "with
administrative responsibilities granted by Congress"?
Second, after discussing the statutory provisions for
congressional removal of the Comptroller General, Part IV
concludes (at page 14): "Against this background; we see no
escape from the conclusion that, because Congress has retained
removal authority over the Comptroller General, he is not an
officer of the Executive Branch. Every authority examined
demonstrates that the Comptroller General may not be entrusted
with executive powers." I suggest compressing these two
sentences into one: "Against this background, we see no escape
from the conclusion that, because Congress has retained removal
authority over the Comptroller General, he may not be entrusted
with executive powers." Also, rather than "executive powers," it
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might be better to say something like "respon sibility for
executing legislative enactments.•
Similarly, six lines from the top of page 17, you refer to
"Recasting the Comptroller General as an officer of the Executive
Branch ••.. • Would you consider deleting this phrase and simply
beginning the sentence with •This"?
as it is written, Part V strongly ~m2lies that q nly
the
t could execute functlons -such as th
co itted to
the
ler Genera 1n ramm- u man-HQ1 lings. This section
may thus be read EOl mpiy that theAc_t.. would be unconstitutional
even if it was committed to a truly independent agency {i.e., an
agency whose officers were removable by neither Congress nor the
President or whose officers were removable by the President only
for cause). While it is not necessary to hold that the Act could
be administered by an independent agency, it seems to me that
there is a way to structure Part V that avoids any implications
one way or the other: shifting the emphasis of the discussion
from the fact that administrative duties such as those delegated
in the Act must be entrusted to an officer controlled by the
President to the fact that they may not be entrusted to an
officer removable by Congress. Thus, I would r etain the first
two paragraphs of Part V, but would frame the rest of that
section along the following lines: ----

----

Petitioners suggest that the duties assigned to
the Comptroller General in the Act are so mechanical
that their performance does not constitute "execution
of the law• in a meaningful sense. On the con trary, we
think that these functions plainly entail execution of
the law for constitutional purposes, and that therefore
they cannot be performed by an officer removable by
Congress. Interpreting and implementing a law enacted
by Congress to carry out the legislative mandate is the
very essence of "execution" of the law. Of course,
Congress may define the scope of executive
responsibility by making legislation more or less
specific, i.e., by choosing how much to incorporate
into the specific terms of a law and how much to leave
to those responsible for that law's proper
administration. However, as Chadha makes clear, having
made its choice in drafting legislation, Congress'
participation must end. Having chosen to le~ve certain
tasks to be carried out by administrators, Congress
cannot control the execution of its enactment by these
administrators except by enacting a new law.
By placing the responsibility for administration
in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal
only by itself, Congress has done exactly that in the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985. The plain language of §251 of the Act requires
the Comptroller General to perform functions and to
make binding decisions with respect to duties which the
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Constitution requires be entrusted to an officer
independent of congressional control. The Constitution
does not permit breaching the boundaries of separated
powers in this fashion. [footnote 7]
Finally, I have several small points that I thought worth
calling to your attention.
(1) The paragraph in the middle of page 7 discusses
Congress' role in the removal process of "Officers of the United
States." However, if the Comptroller General were stripped of
all his executive capacities might he not still be deemed an
"Officer of the United States"? Yet, if he had no executive
responsibilities, Congress might well be able to play a role in
his removal. At the beginning of the paragraph and again later
in the opinion, you use the phrase "officers charged with the
execution of the laws." Is not this phrase preferable?
(2) Rather than citing Schecter Poultry in footnote 7, I
suggest citing a later case that more accurately reflects the law
of nondelegation, such as Yakus v. United States, 321 u.s. 414
(1944)
0

(3) You state on page 16 that the effect of striking down
the 1921 Act would be to make the Comptroller General removable
by the President. I am somewhat hesitant to make this claim.
There are many independent agencies whose heads are appointed for
fixed terms and who are not removable by anyone. Given the
intent of the 1921 Congress, a strong argument could be made that
if the congressional removal provision is struck down, the
Comptroller General should simply serve a term. Could you not
simply delete this sentence? Along the same lines, I suggest
changing the sentence at the beginning of the first full
paragraph on page 17 to read:
"Severance at this late date •••
would significantly alter the role of the Comptroller General by
making him entirely independent of the Congress, possibly
enhancing the ability of the Executive Branch to influence his
performance."
I apologize for the length of these suggestions. You have
done a fine job with a difficult opinion under great time
pressures. Given the importance of this case, however, I thought
it best to place all my suggestions before you.
Sincerely,
'

&lQ
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMeERS OF"

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 9, 1986

Re:

85-1377 - Bowsher v. Synar
85-1378 - United States Senate v.
Synar
85-1379 - O'Neill v. Synar

Dear Chief:
Affirmance of the judgment in this case can be
supported on either a broad rationale or a narrow
one. I think we should decide on which rationale to
adopt before we address specific drafting problems.
Let me briefly summarize the alternative rationales.
The Broad Rationale
Proposition 1 - Executive power can only be
entrusted to the President, or to an officer
removable by the President.
Proposition 2 - The powers entrusted to the
Comptroller General are executive powers.
Proposition 3 - The Comptroller General is not
removable by the President, and therefore may not be
entrusted with executive powers.
Conclusion - The statute is unconstitutional.
The reason this rationale is too broad is that
it would also invalidate (a) the fall-back provision
in Sec. 274 which authorizes Congress itself to
perform the same function as the Comptroller General;
(b) a statute which authorized the functions to be
performed by an independent agency such as the
Federal Reserve Board; and (c) perhaps a statute
which delegated the functions to a newly created
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executive agency whose officers have civil service
status.
The Narrow Rationale
Proposition 1 - The lawmaking process is too
complex to enable us to characterize every step in
the process as exclusively "legislative• or
"executive.•
Proposition 2 - The functions performed by the
Comptroller General under this statute could properly
be characterized as "executive• if they were assigned
to the President, the Secretary of the Treasury, or
some other officer removable by the President. The
same functions may properly be characterized as
"legislative• if they are assigned to the Congress of
the United States or to an agent of the Congress.
Proposition 3 - In the statute before us
Congress has characterized the Comptroller General's
lawmak_ing activities as "legislative" because (a) it
has assigned them to an officer of the Legislative
Branch (both because Congress retains removal power
and because the Comptroller General has long
functioned primarily as a congressional agent)~ and
(b) if that assignment is invalidated, Congress has
decided to perform the functions itself.
.
Proposition 4 - If a lawmaking function of this
importance is to be performed by the Legislative
Branch, it must observe the constitutionally mandated
procedures detailed in Chadha. 462 U.S. at 956-958.
Neither one House nor an agent such as the Speaker or
the Comptroller General can issue commands to the
President of the United States.
Conclusion - The statute is unconstitutional.
Your circulating draft opinion adopts the broad
rationale. In a case of this importance, I think it
is always wise to adopt a narrow rationale if
possible. I agree with the view that we should speak
with "one voice• if possible, but I am afraid I will
not be able to join an opinion that adopts the broad
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rationale that is set forth in your present
circulating draft. If you can substitute the Chadha
rationale, I shall be happy to make specific
suggestions for change. If not, it would probably
save time for me to write separately.

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMI!IEFIS OF

June 10, 1986

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re: Nos. 85-1377, 85-1378, 85-1379, Bowsher v. Synar, etc.

Dear John:
Thank you for your memo dated June 9.

I agree we should first

determine the basic rationale of the opinion in this case.

But I am

not sure that we are as far apart as your memo suggests.
What may seem to be a different view between us may result from a
misreading of the second draft.

That draft makes clear that the cen-

tral point is not your "proposition three" -- "the Comptroller General
is not removable by the President, and therefore may not be entrusted
with executive powers."

On the contrary, the central point is that

the Comptroller General is removable by Congress, and therefore may
not be entrusted with executive powers.

Part III states: "In light of

these precedents, we conclude that Congress cannot reserve for itself
the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the
laws except by impeachment."

Op. at 10.

Part IV states: "Against

this background, we see no escape from the conclusion that, because
Congress has retained removal authority over the Comptroller General,
he is not an officer of the Executive Branch."

Op. at 14.

Part V

states: "It is apparent then, that Congress has placed executive powers in the hands ·of an officer who is subject to removal by Congress.

. .. The

Constitution does not permit breaching the boundaries of sepa-

rated powers in this fashion."

Op. at 16.

There is additional misunderstanding concerning the effect of the
second draft on the fall-back provisions of the Act and on a variety
of other actual and potential legislative schemes.

The opinion would

not invalidate the fall-back provisions of 5274 which essentially in•
volve nothing more than superceding legislation.

Those provisions

require that Congress adopt, and the President sign, a new joint resolution setting budget figures.

I see nothing in the current draft

that would suggest that such a procedure is unconstitutional.
The ability of the Federal Reserve Board to undertake the functions assigned to the Comptroller General under the Act is, of course,
not before us.

Even if it were, I confess that I do not understand

your suggestion that the second draft would cast doubt on that ability, since, unlike the Comptroller General, the members of the Federal
Reserve Board are removable by Congress · only by way of impeachment.
Moreover, the opinion specifically distinguishes questions relating to
the status of independent agencies.

See Op. at 9-10 & n.4.

Because

of this distinguishing language, the opinion would not, as you suggest, invalidate "a newly created executive agency whose officers have
civil service status," if such an agency were ever created.
I am also not sure that I can accept your characterization of your
suggested approach as "the narrow rationale."

To be sure, your ap-

proach might reserve some questions that my approach would answer.
However, it is also clear that your "narrow rationale" would pronounce
on issues that the currently circulating draft does not.

For example,

your "proposition two" is that the "functions [assigned the Comptroller General] may properly be characterized as 'legislative'" merely
because "they are assigned to the Congress of the United States or to

an agent of the Congress."

This strikes me as a fairly sweeping prop-

osition that might unsettle a lot of law in this area.
Some of the changes I am working on in response to Bill Brennan's
memo will reemphasize that the opinion speaks in terms of Congressional removal.

Those changes may eliminate or at least narrow the area

of disagreement between us.

~erhaps

after these changes have been

made, we can determine whether we have any remaining points of disagreement.

I

,

Regards,

Lu'tA)
__,./ '

Justice Stevens

Copies to Conference

June 12, 1986

85-1377 Bowsher v. Synar

Dear Chief:
Please ioin me in your second draft of an opinion
for the Court.
1 have reread your opinion with some care, and it
is in accord with my understanding of our Conference vote.
1 would have no ob1ection, however, to some of the changes
suggested by ot~er Justices so long as the basic framework
of your analvsis remains the same.

I certainly do not want to undercut the type of
independence the great administrative agencies have enjoyed,
and 1 do not thi.nk your opinion - as now drafted - does
this.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

Jn.vrttttt QfDUrt .llf t!tt ~ittb Jtatt.s'
'Jiulfi:ttgton. ~. (If. 2llbi,.~.
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

June 12, 1986

Nos. 85-1377, 85-1378 & 85-1379 Bowsher
v. Synar, U. S. Senate v. Synar &
O'Neill v. Synar

Dear Chief,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

Copies to the Conference

,tluprtnu ~1t1tti &rf tift ~ttb jlbdt•

..-u.frington. ~. ~ 2ll~Jt.~
CH.O.MI!I!!:AS Of'

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 16, 1986

Re:

85-1377 - Bowsher v. Synar
85-1378 - United States Senate v. Synar
85-1379 - O'Neill v. Synar

Dear Chief:
Although I agree with Parts I and II of your
circulating opinion, and with much of what you have written
in Part IV, I think ~n has the better of the argument on
the issue as you have framed it concerning the removal
power. I will therefore write out my own view of the case,
which is patterned after the ra 1ona
set forth in
my letter June 9th. I have almost finished with the first
draft and trust that I will not hold you up too long.
Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

85-1377 Bowsher v. Synar (Mike)
CJ for the Court 5/5/86
1st draft 5/31/86
2nd draft 6/5/86
3rd draft 6/12/86
4th draft 6/27/86
6th draft 7/2/86
7th draft 7/3/86
Joined by WHR 6/3/86
LFP 6/12/86
soc 6/12/86
WJB 6/30/86
BRW dissenting
1st draft 6/16/86
2nd draft 7/1/86
JPS concurring in the judgment
1st draft 6/27/86
2nd draft 7/2/86
Joined by 6/27/86
HAB dissenting
1st draft 6/28/86
JPS will write own view of the case 6/16/86
BRW will dissent 6/2/86
JPS may write separately 6/2/86
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